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o discuss the accounting aspects of
pricing negotiated contracts, it is
necessary to begin with a definition of
negotiated contract. Basically a negotiated
contract is any contract which is not priced
upon the basis of advertising and com
petitive bidding, as normally required in
government procurement. However, there
are various types of negotiated contracts,
in addition to ordinary, firm fixed-price
contracts, to meet special needs, such as
the cost-reimbursement type, the priceredetermination type, and the incentive
type. These will be discussed later.
It is important to understand the re
lationship of contract price negotiation and
the area of items exempt from over-all
price control to appreciate some of the
problems involved in price negotiations. In
practice there is no simple relation be
tween these two things although there is
some correlation; the area of negotiated
contracts is not identified exactly with
the area of products exempt from price
control.
Basically, there have been exempted
from the area of price control those goods
having exclusively a military use, to
gether with all the components and parts
designed solely for use in production of
such military end-items.
The fact that any commodity is sub
ject to a determinable price ceiling does
not mean that contracts will be placed
by the Department of Defense on the
basis of such ceilings. It is a primary re

T

3

sponsibility of procurement officers to ob
tain the lowest possible prices. They
amerely cannot pay in excess of price ceil
ings for items subject to price control,
either under advertising for bids or under
negotiated contracts.
The Department of Defense has not
abandoned the policy of advertising and
obtaining competitive bids as the most de
sirable procurement process, although in
many areas it has been found necessary
to resort to the more extensive use of
negotiated contracts. However, as pro
vided by the Armed Services Procurement
Act the use of negotiated contracts has
been common, even during normal times.
For example, today it still is common
practice to obtain autos and auto trucks
through advertising and competitive bid
ding, including both those having standard
specifications which are subject to price
control, and combat vehicles, which are
exempt from price control.
There have been occasions when ad
vertising has been used, but did not bring
forth bids that were considered to be
really competitive. In such cases the bids
have all been thrown out, and the military
departments have proceeded to negotiate
for lower prices with those submitting
bids. Sometimes this procedure has not
been fully understood, and there has
been some confusion in the minds of the
contractors concerned, with consequent
criticism of this process. This misunder
standing arises from failure to understand

4

Financial Information Needed in Today’s Mobilization Economy

that the competitive bidding process was
discarded as unsuccessful before com
mencing the negotiation process.
It is common practice where the bids
have been thrown out to disclose one
person’s bid to another in order to nego
tiate lower contract prices. It does not
seem to me that this is unethical so long
as one contractor’s cost estimates are not
disclosed to another. No contractor is
compelled to take a government contract
so long as he has materials and a good
market for his products, and in such cases
the procurement officer often finds it dif
ficult to negotiate reasonable prices. He
needs to use every fair means at his dis
posal to attain this objective.
In negotiating contract prices, including
prices for those items subject to price
control, cost accounting plays an important
part, but there are other means, useful
in different degree in different cases, for
the procurement officers’ use in obtaining
reasonable prices. Without going into
these exhaustively, a few may be men
tioned. Certain products, such as clothing,
have been produced in plants operated by
the military departments, under pilot op
erations, for the purposes of aiding pro
duction design, especially from the stand
point of production speed and economy,
and of obtaining a thorough knowledge
of manufacturing costs. In other instances,
relative price quotations obtained inform
ally from several sources, knowledge of a
contractor’s previous prices, or the con
tinuous price history of an item, provide
useful information. It is not the purpose
here to deal with all the tools a con
tracting officer has at his disposal for
purposes of contract negotiation, but
merely to indicate that tools other than
cost accounting are used.
Cost accounting has utility in assisting
a contracting officer to negotiate prices in
proportion to the failure of all other
means. Sometimes it provides almost a
sole basis for price determination, but in
other cases it provides only one factor of
several. This use of accounting in pricing
negotiated contracts is the aspect of great
est interest to accountants.
One should never lose sight of the fact
that a negotiated price must provide for

a profit to a contractor as well as for a
return of his costs. The entire price
should be such as to provide the greatest
incentive to a contractor to reduce his
costs and his over-all prices. Other ob
jectives which must be solved in negotiat
ing contracts include quality of product,
attainment of speed of delivery required,
and providing continuity of operation of
key facilities so they will be available in
event of all-out mobilization.
There has been a dearth of written
material on the subject of profit allow
ances. More has been written on this
subject in connection with renegotiation of
contracts than with respect to initial con
tract pricing. However, all that has been
said with respect to the factors to be
considered in determining the reasonable
ness of over-all profits in renegotiation ap
plies also in the initial pricing of individual
contracts. You will recall that these fac
tors, according to the Renegotiation Act,
include interest on the capital investment;
allowance for risks of loss of capital, cost
changes, product guarantees, etc.; reward
for efficiency and low production costs;
complexity of the product; the character
of the industry, with special reference to
value added in production to the cost of
the materials, as distinguished from mere
merchandising; and the contractor’s gen
eral production and delivery performance.
The combination of these factors in any
individual instance is an extremely dif
ficult matter and can never be made the
basis of formula. The complexity of this
problem of profit allowances explains why
the Department of Defense has not yet
published Section XVI of the Armed Serv
ices Procurement Regulations on this allimportant subject for the information of
contractors, as well as for the guidance
of contracting officers.
At this point I wish to point out that
one essential principle in initial pricing
of negotiated contracts is that each con
tract should stand on its own feet. If a
contractor is to be compensated for risk
taking at all, there should be no con
sideration at the time of making a new
contract for compensating him for a loss
sustained on some previous contract.
It is sometimes wondered by the public
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whether it would not be simpler and more
economical for the government to permit
loose initial pricing practices and then
force more attention on the recovery of
excessive profits in renegotiation. The De
partment of Defense opposes this view, as
does the Congress. Letting down the bars
in such a manner in the initial pricing
process would contribute to great laxity
in production practices with waste and
extravagance that would only result in
greater net prices to the government, even
after renegotiation. The process of initial
pricing must be approached with sincerity
and earnestness in every contract negotia
tion.
The outright, firm fixed-price contract
is favored by the Department of Defense
over other types of negotiated contracts.
However, where the lack of production or
cost experience of a contractor is inad
equate to permit the initial determination
of a fixed price or where the existence of
other large indeterminate risks would re
quire otherwise the allowance of a sub
stantial element of contingencies to com
pensate for the risk, the government stands
ready and prefers to take the risk through
offering a cost-reimbursement type of con
tract or a price-redetermination clause un
der a contract nominally called a fixedprice contract.
One factor in the negotiation of the out
right, firm fixed-price contract is a break
down of a contractor’s cost estimates.
Wherever a contractor has a standard cost
system, the use of such standards based
upon bills of material and time studies
are especially valuable. Even where the
method of making cost estimates is not
related to a standard cost system, the
reliability of the cost estimates may not
be great unless the estimates have been
made with the use of bills of materials
and time studies. Actual cost experience
under job-cost or process-cost accounting
systems have their place where standard
costs are not available, although it will
be appreciated that such costs do not
provide as much assurance as to their
reasonableness as do standard costs.
The price-redetermination clause per
mits subsequent adjustment of an initial
fixed price based upon the attainment of
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actual cost experience during performance
of the contract. Such redeterminations may
be based upon analyses of actual cost at
more than one stage during the contract.
In general, it is provided that price re
determination always result in price re
ductions, but it is possible by specific
contract terms to provide for increases as
well. Therefore, it is a usual practice to
set the initial price high enough to take
care of all contingencies.
It will be appreciated that a price-redetermination arrangement eliminates cer
tain risks which would be sustained under
a firm fixed-price contract. To this extent
the contractor is not entitled under a
price-redetermination clause to as large a
profit allowance as a factor in determin
ing the entire price. In this connection
the timing of redetermination is significant
in reducing the risk; for example, a
price redetermination near the time of
completion of the contract would remove
practically all risks.
Price redetermination clauses are used
very extensively today. They have tended
to supersede the cost-plus-fixed-fee con
tract. Although its objectives are the same
as the cost-reimbursement type of contract,
it has certain advantages. Among the ad
vantages are greater flexibility in recog
nizing and allowing for all factors that
should be considered in determining a
reasonable profit margin, and the reduc
tion of contract auditing, with elimination
of the power of the Comptroller General
to make disallowances of contract costs
because costs are merely one factor in the
determination of the entire price by agree
ment between the contractor and contract
ing officer. From the standpoint of the
government a disadvantage of the priceredetermination clause, as compared with
the fixed-price contract, is that it reduces
the bargaining power of the contracting
officer to some extent.
In principle it should be noted that the
use of historical costs in price redeter
minations should be tempered to allow
for predicted costs during the remainder
of the contract, considering cost trends
and all the production factors which will
have a bearing upon subsequent costs. In
this respect the use of the price-redetermi-
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nation clause is different than the use of
the cost-reimbursement type contract.
A modification of the price-redetermi
nation clause to provide, in principle, cer
tain incentives to contractors to reduce
prices, based upon possible cost reduc
tions, is the incentive-type contract. From
the standpoint of the government, this
type of contract depends for its success
upon the predetermination of a reasonable
cost “target,” because cost savings with
respect to the target are shared by the
government and the contractor. If the
goal is set too high, a contractor will
realize excessive profits not warranted by
its actual cost performance. On the other
hand, if the goal is set too low, while it
may have the effect of creating pressure
on the contractor for low costs, it may
reward him inadequately for his efforts.
The incentive-type contract requires, then,
consideration of actual costs of produc
tion upon completion of the contract, as
well as the cost target before beginning
the contract.
Least favored of all types of negotiated
contracts is the cost-reimbursement type
of contract, the principal form of which
is known as the cost-plus-fixed-fee con
tract, so familiar in World War II. Under
this type of contract, the contractor re
ceives a fee predetermined before the be
ginning of the contract, usually based
upon a percentage of estimated cost; it
is not subject to increase. There is some
tendency towards lack of flexibility in
the allowance of fixed fees as compared
with profit allowances under price-redetermination clauses, and a much greater
preoccupation with actual historical costs
as a major factor in establishing the re
imbursement to the contractor. On the
other hand, there are some contractors
who much prefer the cost-reimbursement
type of contract to any other, because it
provides definite assurance of the return
of actual costs with the accompanying re
duction of risks. It is a more or less gen
eral practice of some large industrial
corporations, who act as agents by con
tract for the operation of certain govern
ment-owned plants, to use a cost-reim
bursement type of contract under which
they receive management fees together

with an allowance for all the actual op
erating costs of the plants.
The Armed Services Procurement Reg
ulations contain a Statement of Contract
Cost Principles in Section XV. This state
ment, however, is applicable only to cost
reimbursement type contracts, including
those with nonprofit institutions for re
search and development work and with
construction contractors, as well as supply
and research contracts with manufacturing
concerns. This statement has been criti
cized, but it has been generally accepted
by industry for the purpose for which it
was intended.
However, there has been an unfortunate
lack of a statement of contract cost prin
ciples applicable to fixed-price contracts,
including those containing price-redeter
mination and incentive clauses. There have
been allegations that contracting officers
have used cost data supplied by contract
auditors for use in negotiation of fixedprice contracts based exactly upon the
cost principles stated in Section XV. Pos
sibly this is unavoidable in the absence
of complete written cost principles. In
any event, the Department of Defense has
accepted the need for a statement of con
tract cost principles with respect to fixedprice contracts, and such a statement is
now being prepared. Consideration will
be given to a complete revision of Section
XV, with the intent, if possible, of estab
lishing one set of contract cost principles
applicable to all types of negotiated con
tracts.
I do not wish here to discuss contract
cost principles in detail, but a few observa
tions on this subject may be of interest.
We all subscribe to the principle that
equity should prevail in the determina
tion of costs, either estimated or actual,
for pricing negotiated contracts. We also
recognize there is an occasional contractor
who is wasteful and extravagant accord
ing to our standards, and we desire by
contract to place some limits upon his
costs where he is to be reimbursed on
the basis of costs under any type of con
tract. We believe the vast majority of
well-run American corporations will agree
with this principle, and, they will as tax
payers, desire that the occasional offender
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be kept in line and not overstep himself.
Contractors who have had experience
with contract cost principles should rec
ognize generally that the judgment of the
individual management as to reasonable
ness of cost items is not often questioned.
However, based upon principle, there have
been and are frequent relatively picayunish
disallowances of small relative significance
that offend the sense of equity of con
tractors and result in criticism far out of
proportion to the amounts involved.
We may also state that Section XV of
the statement of contract cost principles
is too rigid. It draws too sharp a line be
tween those items of cost which are con
sidered to be allowable and those which
are considered to be unallowable. It must
be recognized that this statement was pre
pared solely for use with cost-reimburse
ment type contracts which largely relate
to products of a specialized nature for
which the government is the sole customer.
We recognize that the problems of cost
ing standard commercial products, or
items related thereto, for sale through
normal commercial channels are different
from the problems encountered in pricing
products which are the subject of cost
reimbursement-type, prime contracts. In
practice, even without a statement of con
tract cost principles, we believe these dif
ferences are generally being recognized
in pricing fixed-price contracts.
The foregoing comments all add up to
the conclusion that the revised statement
of contract cost principles should be more
explicit with respect to the circumstances
under which various elements of costs are
considered to be allowable or unallowable.
Reasons for unallowability should be
clearly set forth to the public.
In connection with the establishment of
a complete statement of contract cost prin
ciples, the Department of Defense has con
ferred and will continue to confer with
and receive advice from one of the com
mittees of the American Institute of Ac
countants as well as committees from
various other groups, including nonpro
fessional trade associations. In this pro
cess, you may be assured that the views
of accountants and businessmen on the
accounting aspects of pricing negotiated
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contracts will receive a full airing. We
shall also confer with and ask advice of
the General Accounting Office on this sub
ject, but we recognize the ultimate respon
sibility of the Department of Defense to
adopt a statement that will be fair to both
government and business and be proof
against criticism from the public and the
Congress, who have a vital interest in
these matters.
It should be understood that the con
tracting agencies of the federal govern
ment have the power to make specific
agreements with contractors regarding the
items which are allowable as contract
costs and the methods of allocation of
contract costs to products subject to pric
ing under negotiated contracts. To the
extent possible, it is desirable that the
contract terms be specific as to cost prin
ciples. Only to the extent they are not
specific can there be later disagreement
between the parties or with representatives
of the General Accounting Office in exer
cising their power to review contract pay
ments.
I would like to close with a brief dis
cussion of two important cost problems
presently facing us.
Since World War II, there has gradually
grown the practice, in the determination
of costs under cost-reimbursement-type
contracts, intended to simplify and ex
pedite reimbursements, of a predetermina
tion by negotiation of overhead rates. In
practice, it has been found that such
negotiations have been time-consuming
and expensive, so that there is some ques
tion regarding the simplicity of the prac
tice. Moreover, the policy has recently
been attacked on the basis that the pre
determination of overhead rates has been
unfair and unreasonable from the stand
point of the government because (I) in
many instances actual overhead rates un
der revised schedules of production have
been less than those established, and (2)
that once overhead rates are predetermined
with respect to direct labor, there is a
positive incentive to contractors to be in
efficient in the use of direct labor in the
same manner that the former cost-plus-apercentage-of-cost contract was a positive
incentive to contractors to increase their
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aggregate costs. It is possible that the use
of predetermined overhead rates may be
suspended.
I have been asked to comment on the
present status of amortization of emer
gency facilities as an allowable item of
contract cost. When consideration was first
given to this matter, it was realized that
the certificates had been issued for nec
essary expansion of practically all types of
American industry, including businesses
whose products’ selling prices are limited
by price controls, those whose selling
prices are subject to regulation, such as
railroads and electric light and power
companies, and those engaged in the pro
duction of military end-items. Therefore,
it was well understood that it would be
impossible to lay down a single rule ap
plicable to all such kinds of operations.
After many discussions with various
agencies of the Government, on 14 August
1951, the Director of Defense Mobilization,
Mr. Charles E. Wilson, issued Defense
Mobilization Order No. 11 making it per
missive, but not mandatory, to allow ac
celerated amortization as an item of con
tract cost to the extent that such
amortization is based upon excluding the
portion of the cost of facilities estimated
to be fairly allocable to the post-emergency
period. Simultaneously, he suspended the
issuance of certificates of necessity for
sixty days, with certain exceptions, and
asked for a survey by the Defense Pro
duction Administration of the practices in
issuance of certificates of necessity, in
cluding a study in cooperation with the
procurement agencies, of certificates pre
viously issued from the standpoint of de
termining the portion of the cost of the
facilities that should be allowable as costs
under negotiated contracts. This determin
ation was to be made without intent to
revise the amounts certified for tax pur
poses. On the basis of the survey, pro
cedures were to be established for similar
determinations with respect to certificates
to be issued in the future.
The methods and the degree of applica
cation of these principles have not as yet
been definitely determined. However, the
Administrator of the Defense Production
Administration recently appointed a com

mittee composed principally of repre
sentatives of business for the purpose
of making recommendations on this sub
ject. It is hoped that through the efforts
of this committee principles will be formu
lated in implementation of the directive.
It was natural that the question should
be raised as to the practicability of mak
ing estimates of loss of economic useful
ness of emergency facilities applicable
to the emergency period. While, in our
opinion, such estimates can and should
be made, it cannot be denied that they
require the exercise of a high degree of
judgment. Those who doubt that estimates
of loss of economic usefulness can be
fairly determined would prefer to allow
only normal depreciation on such facilities
in contract pricing, leaving contractors to
receive any additional recoveries on emer
gency facilities through tax savings on
that portion of the amortization which is
in excess of normal depreciation. This
theory, in our opinion, is unsound in that
it fails to take into consideration the
fact that full recovery of loss of economic
usefulness can only be effected if amortiza
tion of emergency facilities is allowed as
an element of cost in contract pricing.
Accountants familiar with the subject will
be thoroughly in accord with this state
ment.
Undoubtedly, most contractors who
sought and obtained certificates of neces
sity had an eye on the Renegotiation Act
of 1951, as well as the Revenue Act, in
making decisions relative to the acquisi
tion of emergency facilities under certifi
cates. The Renegotiation Act of 1951,
consistent with the practice in World War
II, provided for the allowance of amor
tization as an element of cost of renego
tiable business upon the same basis as
allowable for tax purposes. However, this
provision of the Renegotiation Act may
be amended, by the so-called Eberharter
Amendment now being considered, to pro
vide a limitation on the allowance of
amortization based upon the same stand
ard as provided in Mr. Wilson’s directive
on initial contract pricing. Such uniformity
would be desirable, provided the Wilson
directive is actually implemented in initial
contract pricing.
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Renegotiating Under

The 1951 Act
John T. Koehler, Chairman, Renegotiation Board

before you this afternoon
charged with the task of discussing
“contract renegotiation.” In view of my
limited knowledge of the subject, I look
upon this task with a considerable amount
of controlled enthusiasm and can only hope
that, after I have finished, you will not
charge me with having accepted your
hospitality under false pretenses.
I moved into my present job on Wednes
day last from the Navy Department where,
for the past two and a half years, I have
been Assistant Secretary in charge of all
procurement and production programs. In
this assignment, I have had ample oppor
tunity to deal directly with industry and I
learned to appreciate the part industry
has played, and must continue to play, in
the defense of the nation.
We Americans are indeed fortunate that
our tremendous industrial power permits
us to produce great quantities of
highly complicated and scientific equip
ment and that it permits us to provide
our servicemen with the finest equipment in
the world and to make up in firepower,
what we lack in manpower.
It is hardly necessary to remind you that
our industrial power depends, for its very
existence, on a strong, vigorous, and healthy
national economy and that that econo
my depends, in part, upon a careful hus
banding of our national resources. Ever
since June 1950, our governmental expend
itures for military purposes have been
increasing at a rapid rate. For the fiscal
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year ended June 30, 1951, the total De
partment of Defense obligations exceeded
49 billion dollars of which 35.3 billion
dollars covered procurement obligations
for major equipment, supplies, military
construction, and expansion of production
facilities. For. the fiscal year ending June
30, 1952, these defense obligations, includ
ing military construction, will exceed 60
billion dollars and military orders are cur
rently being placed at a rate in excess of
one billion dollars a week.
To add to the magnitude of our task,
this rapidly expanding defense production
program is not, and cannot be, evenly
distributed throughout the country. It is
most highly concentrated in aircraft, com
bat vehicles, electronic equipment, some
vessel construction, new weapons such as
guided missiles, and other items the prime
contracts for which must go to contractors
located, in the main, in areas of industrial
concentration. By subcontracting and other
means, we must do what we can to mini
mize this concentration. We must guard
against creating new facilities in cases
where existing facilities are able to carry
the load; we must assure a sufficient sup
ply of machine tools, production facilities,
and critical materials to our manufacturers
if the production rate of end items is to be
maintained at a pace consistent with se
curity requirements. Finally, but by no
means least important, we must do what
we can to assure small business a fair
percentage of military procurement in
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order that we may have as broad an
industrial base as possible.
Up to this point, I have been speaking
more as a government official charged with
procurement responsibilities than as a
Member of the Renegotiation Board. How
ever, I hope you will agree with me that,
if confined to its proper sphere, renegotia
tion can and should play an important part
in government procurement of military
materiel during war and during periods
of preparedness such as face us now. In
its statement of policy in the Renegotiation
Act of 1951, Congress declared that the
sound execution of the National Defense
Program requires the elimination of ex
cessive profits made from contracts made
with the United States and from related
subcontracts and that such excessive profits
be eliminated in accordance with the pro
visions of the Act.
I shall not take up your time with a
consideration of previous renegotiation
legislation since I am sure that all of you
are thoroughly familiar with it. I believe
that I can summarize our past experience
in renegotiation by saying that, by and
large, an experiment which began in 1942
thoroughly proved its worth during the
years of World War II. It has been esti
mated that determinations of excessive
profits amounting to over eleven billion dol
lars were made during the effective period
of the 1942 Act. In addition to these direct
savings, renegotiation exercised a substan
tial influence, which cannot be calculated
in dollars, in bringing about lower prices
for Armed Services procurement while
civilian prices were slowly rising.
One of the distinguishing features of
renegotiation is that each individual con
tractor is renegotiated on the basis of the
merits of his own particular case. There
is no fixed base for classes or types of
industry or for industry in general, but the
same uniform standard factors are applied
to each of the individual cases. In this con
nection, I would like to call your atten
tion to the following statement which ap
peared in the Military Renegotiation
Regulations for the 1948 Act:
“In general, reasonable profits should be
determined by over-all evaluation of the
particular factors present without limita

tion or restriction by any fixed formula with
respect to rate of profit, or otherwise. Re
negotiation proceedings should not result
in a profit based on the principle of a
percentage of cost. Contractors who sell
at lower prices and produce at lower costs
through good management, improved
methods of production, close control of
expenditures, and careful purchasing will
receive a more favorable determination
than those who do not. Such favorable or
unfavorable determination will be re
flected in the profits allowed to be re
tained by the contractor or subcontractor
as nonexcessive. Claims of a contractor for
favorable consideration must be supported
by established facts, analyses, and ap
propriate comparisons.”
I now come to a consideration of the
1951 Act and I hope you will forgive me
if I confine my remarks to a resume of
statutory provisions and do not venture
into the realm of predicting broad policy.
I might add, in passing, that the ink was
hardly dry on our commissions before
advice began rolling in but, to date, the
only official action the Board has taken
is to grant an extension of time to March
1, 1952 for filing the financial statements
required by Section 105(e) (1) of the Act
to all persons having fiscal years ending
prior to November 30, 1951.
But to return to the Act, the Renegotia
tion Act of 1951 was approved on March
23, 1951 and provides for the renegotia
tion of certain contracts made with the
United States in the course of the execu
tion of the national defense program in
order to eliminate excessive profits. The
principal provisions are summarized as
follows:
The Renegotiation Board is established
as an independent executive establishment
consisting of five members appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The principal office of the Board must be
in the District of Columbia. For the first
time, therefore, we have a Board which is
wholly independent of those agencies of
government charged with contract negotia
tion. I speak for all members of the Board
when I say we fully recognize the impor
tance of this provision. It has often been
said that “renegotiation is the opposite
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side of the coin of negotiation.” I cannot
accept that statement. It is true that there
must be close liaison between procurement
personnel and renegotiation personnel but
that both groups should report to a com
mon superior who has procurement re
sponsibilities is, in my opinion, an un
sound concept. Congress has taken the
same view for, should he Board decide to
delegate any of its authority, such delega
tion may not be to any person engaged in
procurement or in the supervision of
procurement.
The Act applies to: (1) receipts and
accruals on or after January 1, 1951 from
contracts and related subcontracts with the
military departments, the Department of
Commerce, the General Services Adminis
tration, the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
the Canal Zone Government, the Panama
Canal Company, and the Housing and
Home Finance Agency, and (2) to receipts
and accruals from contracts and related
subcontracts with such other agencies
performing defense functions as the Presi
dent may designate. The Act does not ap
ply, however, to receipts and accruals
attributable to performance prior to July
1, 1950 under contracts and subcontracts
which were not subject to the Renegotia
tion Act of 1948. (By an Executive Order
dated June 27, 1951 the President desig
nated the following additional “Depart
ments”: The Federal Civil Defense
Administration, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the United States
Coast Guard. The provisions of the Act
are applicable to all contracts with each
of these agencies named in the Order and
to related subcontracts, to the extent of
the amounts received or accrued by a con
tractor or subcontractor on or after the
first day of July, 1951.)
Contracts which the Board determines
do not have a direct and immediate con
nection with the national defense are
mandatorily exempt and the Board’s reg
ulations and determinations in this regard
shall not be subject to review or redeter
mination by any court or other agency.
The Act applies to all contracts falling
within its terms, and such contracts shall
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contain stipulations consenting to the
elimination of excessive profits through
renegotiation. It does not apply to receipts
and accruals attributable to performance
after December 31, 1953; nor to certain
types of contracts specifically exempted
from the Act, or granted exemption by the
Board, which exemptions may be granted
both individually and by general classes
or types.
A contractor or subcontractor having
less than $250,000, and certain subcontrac
tors such as brokers or sales representa
tives having less than $25,000, of yearly
renegotiable business shall not be renego
tiated under the Act. If the noted amounts
are exceeded, the amount of profits that
may be eliminated under renegotiation
cannot be greater than the amount of such
excess. In computing the aggregate of re
ceipts and accurals of contractors under
common control, intercompany sales shall
be eliminated.
Every holder of contracts or subcon
tracts subject to the Act shall file with the
Board, on or before the beginning of the
fourth calendar month following the end
of the contractor’s fiscal year, a financial
statement in such form as the Board shall,
by regulation, prescribe. In addition, the
contractor must furnish such other infor
mation, records and/or data as may be
determined by the Board to be necessary.
A penalty of $10,000 and/or one year’s
imprisonment is provided for wilful mis
representation or failure to comply. The
Board also shall, have the power to audit
the books and records of subject contrac
tors and subcontractors.
In determining excessive profits, the
Board must give favorable recognition to
the efficiency of the contractor, and in
addition must consider the following fac
tors: reasonableness of costs and profits
(with particular regard to volume of pro
duction and comparison of war and peace
time products), the net worth (with par
ticular regard to the amount and source of
public and private capital employed), con
tribution to the defense effort, the extent of
risk assumed, the character of the busi
ness, and such other factors (to be pub
lished by the Board) as public interest and
fair dealing may require. All allowable
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Federal income tax deductions and exclu
sions shall, to the extent allocable, be al
lowed as items of cost, including any
excess of costs paid or incurred in the
preceding fiscal year over the amount of
receipts or accruals subject to the Act
which were received or accrued in such
preceding fiscal year, but only to the
extent that such excess is not attributable
to the gross inefficiency of the contractor.
No loss so incurred in any fiscal year end
ing prior to January 1, 1951, may be
carried forward.
Renegotiation proceedings will be com
menced by the mailing of notice to that
effect to the contractor by registered mail.
The Board will endeavor to make an
agreement with the contractor with re
spect to the elimination of excessive profits.
If no such agreement is reached, the Board
shall issue an order determining the
amount, if any, of excessive profits, notify
the contractor thereof and, if the con
tractor requests it, furnish a statement of
the facts used as a basis for the determina
tion and its reasons therefor. Determina
tions shall be based on the aggregate of
receipts and accruals during the fiscal year
or other agreed period under contracts
held by the contractors, except that con
tracts may be treated separately on request.
By agreement with any contractor, the
Board may in its discretion conduct re
negotiation of two or more related contrac
tors on a consolidated basis. Renegotiation
must be conducted on a consolidated basis
with a parent and its subsidiary corpora
tion if all the corporations included in
such affiliated groups request renegotiation
on such basis and consent to such regula
tions as the Board shall prescribe, includ
ing regulations for determining the amount
of excessive profits allocable, for tax credit
purposes, to each corporation of the affil
iated group.
After an agreement or order for the
elimination of excessive profits is made, the
Board shall direct the appropriate agency
head to eliminate the excessive profits by
reductions in amounts payable under con
tracts otherwise due the contractors; or
by directing Government contractors, and
subcontractors thereunder, to withhold
amounts due to any contractor or subcon

tractor having excessive profits to be
eliminated by suit; or by any combination
of such methods. The Board has the
power to extend the time for payment of
sums due under an agreement or order.
Protection is provided for assignees of
subject contracts against withholding for
renegotiation liability of the assignors by
limiting such action to the extent provided
in the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940
as now or hereafter amended. Banks and
other financing institutions to which any
subcontracts are assigned are also protect
ed against withholding or recovery.
The Act provides for a period of limita
tion—the contractor is discharged from
all liabilities for excessive profits for a
given fiscal year if renegotiation proceed
ings are not commenced within one year
after the filing of the financial statement
required to be filed with respect to such
fiscal year; or if an agreement or order
is not made within two years following the
commencement of the renegotiation pro
ceeding. To this there are two exceptions:
the two-year period may be extended by
mutual agreement and it does not apply
to review of an order by the Board if the
order is made within the two-year period.
Within ninety days a petition may be
filed in the Tax Court for a redetermina
tion of excessive profits determined by the
Board. This is a proceeding de novo to
redetermine excessive profits, if any. The
filing of such a petition shall stay the
execution of the order, if the petitioner
post sufficient bond within ten days. With
certain limitations, interest on excessive
profits shall accrue at the rate of four
percent from the 30th day after the order
of the Board or from the date fixed in an
agreement for repayment. Interest at the
same rate shall accrue in favor of the
contractor on any amounts required to be
refunded after redetermination by the Tax
Court.
I believe that the foregoing will give
you a broad overall picture of the present
law. I have purposely omitted from this
summary any discussion of technical
changes in the World War II Act made to
coordinate it with the provisions of the
1951 Act. I have similarly omitted any dis
cussion of the manner in which the transi
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tion is to be made from the 1948 Act to
the 1951 Act. I do not anticipate any
substantial difficulty in this transition.
In conclusion, I should like you to con
sider, if you will, one final fact which is all
too often overlooked or bypassed by many
of those who are not charged with the grave
responsibility of carrying out a national
program, whether it be in the field of re
armament, economic stabilization, renego
tiation, or in one of the many areas which
have as their common goal the welfare and
security of our people. If these programs
are to succeed, their success depends, in
large measure, upon affirmative answers to
three questions, namely:
1. Is there a need for the program?
2. Is the plan for carrying it out a
sound one? and
3. Can competent personnel be secured
to do the job?
I am convinced that there is a real need
for renegotiation in times like these and
that the 1951 Act answers that need with
sound legislation. I am also convinced that
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the Renegotiation Board will be unable to
do an effective job unless it can secure the
services of competent and objective people
both in and out of government to ensure
proper organization, effective implementa
tion and fair and impartial results. It fol
lows, as it always does, that the ‘answer
ultimately lies in the capabilities and
objectivity of the people who are called
upon to do the job. I would like you to
remember this fact when, in the near fu
ture, I call upon representatives of your
profession to drop their civilian pursuits
for the time being in order to help us
discharge our responsibilities.
Each of us in these perilous times must
bear his fair share of the added burdens
which international tensions have placed
upon us. As you and I place upon our
shoulders our fair share of the load, we
can hold our heads high and close ranks
with our fellow men, whether in or out
of uniform, in our mutual defense of our
beloved country.
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s accountants in close touch with the it is necessary to have collective action to
restrain individuals and businesses from
operations of particular businesses,
you are keenly aware of the problems that doing some of the things that come natur
ally. Collective action means that the indi
mobilization has brought and is bringing
vidual is subjected to more or less re
to them. Some of these problems, such as
those involved in 5-year amortization, re straint by his fellows; it is government of
negotiation, the excess-profits tax and one kind or another. Some of our govern
price adjustments under price regulation ment is carried on through organizations
orders, directly raise accounting problems. that are essentially private in character.
Others are more general problems of busi Your own American Institute of Account
ness management. In the mobilization pe ants is an example of such an organiza
riod both the importance and difficulties of tion. It performs functions of a govern
anticipating future developments with re mental character with respect both to
examinations for certification and to the
spect to such matters as availability of
setting of standards for accounting pro
materials, the desirability of expansion,
cedures.
probable defense contracts and the course
Many kinds of restraints, however, can
of demand and prices are multiplied.
Broadly considered, the economic prob not safely be entrusted to private
forms of collective action. The particular
lems of mobilization of the nation as a
whole consist of the sum total of the eco group may have interests that, if they were
nomic problems of all the different con served, would be detrimental to the interest
sumers, businesses, workers, farmers, in of the rest of the public. In general, if we
must be governed, we want to be governed
vestors, pensioners, etc. This does not
by people who, in the final analysis, de
imply, however, that if every individual
rive their power from the whole public
and every business seeks to solve his own
and not by particular groups.
problems that it will all add up to a
Successful government has two aspects.
solution of the problems of the economy
as a whole. For example, particular busi One is the intelligent design and execu
nesses may aggravate the national eco tion of measures and policies appropriate
nomic problem of scarce materials by suc to solve the problems giving rise to govern
mental action. The other is the understand
cessful efforts to accumulate and hoard
ing and support of a large majority of the
them, while individuals and groups may
population. Democratic governments can
aggravate the rise in prices by successful
force rules down the throats of only a
efforts to protect themselves against such
small recalcitrant minority.
a rise.
Why not rely on automatic market forces
Accordingly, in the mobilization period,

A
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to achieve the economic goals of mobili be diverted from less important to more
zation? Why does partial mobilization
important kinds of production and par
require an enlargement of governmental ticularly from production of civilian goods
economic programs? Do not these pro to production of military equipment and
grams reflect the “grasping of powersupplies. Big shifts must be made and
hungry bureaucracies”? To answer the last made quickly. Making these production
question first, if I can trust my own obser shifts creates another major economic
vation, virtually no one in government likes
problem, that of maintaining a stable econ
controls. It does not stand to reason that
omy. The more successful the effort speedi
businessmen of high prestige who go to ly to enlarge necessary defense production
Washington suddenly develop a fondness the more intense the stabilization problems
for controls that they formerly detested.
are likely to be. The drastic rechanneling
Operating controls is a terrific nuisance for
of production introduces strains and dis
the Government and may boomerang polit tortions into the economy. Some persons
ically at any time. Controls are adopted
find themselves luckily better off than they
only when they clearly appear to be
ever were before. Some, through no fault
needed; they are imposed reluctantly, and
of their own, may suffer temporary unem
for that reason sometimes belatedly.
ployment, or business loss, or be obliged
The reason why automatic market forces to change jobs and move their families to
strange surroundings.
are inadequate to achieve the economic
goals of mobilization, thereby necessitat
The most universal and most dangerous
ing special governmental economic pro type of economic instability that is likely
grams, is that the jolt of mobilization is too
to result from the rechanneling of produc
great for market forces to absorb. The tion is of course that spreading rise of
result of the unassisted operation of these
prices which we call inflation.
forces might well be a market chaos that
The problem of inflation arises primarily
would not only destroy economic stability,
because demand runs ahead of supply.
but seriously impair defense production as
Government is spending more and taking
well.
more of the total product, which leaves a
smaller faction for consumers and private
The economic problems of mobilization
business. But consumers in the aggregate
that will not solve themselves without
seek to spend more because a larger num
governmental action are of two kinds. The
ber of persons are working longer hours at
more basic one is the problem of securing
an adequate volume and speed of defense
generally higher wages and so have more
production. The other problem which de income. Businesses seek to expand their
plants and equipment and to build up
rives from the first is that of maintaining a
inventories in order to do more business
stable economy, particularly a stable price
level during the period of build-up in de and make more profit. These buying pres
sures are accentuated when persons and
fense production . . .
businesses spend their accumulated sav
The production problem of defense
ings or borrowed funds. With spending
mobilization is to increase production of
thus tending to outrun supplies, inflation
needed defense material and supporting
results unless measures are taken to pre
productive capacity as rapidly as possible
vent it.
up to the levels required. To achieve this
These, then, in brief are the two major
increase requires the devotion of resources
—both physical resources and human re economic problems of mobilization. What
sources—to kinds of production that will are the programs by which the government
have top importance in promoting the mili is endeavoring to solve them?
The first and most basic program for
tary security of the nation. This mobiliza
securing the required expansion of de
tion of production is partly a matter of
fense production is the procurement pro
increasing total production through the
gram, including the planning and schedul
more effective use of resources that have
ing of production. Congress appropriates
been idle or not effectively employed.
the funds and authorizes contracts for
Mobilization also requires that resources
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goods and services need to clothe, feed,
train, and equip the armed forces with
adequate supplies of modern weapons, and
to build a productive machine capable of
a greatly expanded production of weapons,
if required by all-out war. The military
planners draw the specifications and the
procurement officers let the contracts. The
production is carried on by private indus
try.
Ordering the goods is not all that is
required to assure their prompt produc
tion. Supplies of many materials and facili
ties, especially metals and machine tools,
are insufficient to fill all demands. To
protect the procurement program from
being halted or delayed by the competing
demands of consumers and businesses, it
has proved necessary to adopt priority and
allocation programs. Defense production
and essential civilian production are given
the green light, but many other projects
must be postponed. Making sound deci
sions regarding essentiality is both an im
portant and a difficult task. Not only
profits and employment are at stake, but
more important, the national welfare, pro
ductive strength, and military safety.
Several measures are used to give posi
tive encouragement to business to expand
needed productive facilities. In some cases,
long-term purchase contracts are granted
to reduce risks of loss from plant expan
sion. The privilege of depreciating prop
erty for tax purposes over a 5-year period
instead of over the longer periods which
would otherwise be necessary had been
granted for many new facilities. Loan
programs provide Federal funds for im
portant projects when private financing is
not available. In some cases, subsidies have
been used to get an expansion of mineral
production that might not take place at
market prices. A voluntary manpower pro
gram encourages training, bringing new
persons into the labor market, and placing
them in jobs where they will be most use
ful workers.
I turn now to the stabilization programs
which relate largely to the prevention or
mitigation of inflationary price increases
of all kinds—raw material prices, whole
sale prices, retail prices, wages, salaries,
rents, and so on. Prices are very sensitive

to the production shifts of the defense
program and might become chaotic in the
absence of stabilization programs. One
man’s price is another man’s cost. Price
rises in any important economic sector are
likely to give rise to price rises elsewhere,
and so on around, which is the inflationary
spiral.
Prices are determined in large measure
by the relation between supply and de
mand. Price stabilization measures ac
cordingly seek to restrain demand while
at the same time increasing supply. The
increase in supply by increased production
helps furnish the goods which consumers
and businesses desire. The more of a per
son’s wants that are satisfied, the more
willing he is likely to be to accept a re
duction in the remainder of his expendi
tures. However, defense production cannot
cure the inflation problem, because the
added production is reflected in larger in
comes which consumers and businesses
have to spend and thus increases demand.
The first and most basic stabilization
program is taxation. During mobilization,
more resources must be used by govern
ment; that means that the public must use
less resources. The government commands
the resources by spending, so the public
must spend less. Taxes pay for the govern
ment spending and cut down the spending
of business and consumers. Truly adequate
taxes in a mobilization period would re
duce private demand sufficient to offset
increases in government demand. This
would require at least a balanced budget
and probably a large surplus.
This emphasis on taxation is not intend
ed to imply that tax increases alone could
be counted on to maintain economic stabil
ity and prevent price rises during the mo
bilization period. The record of July 1950
to March 1951 showed clearly that in
anticipation of the defense program large
spurts of consumer and business buying as
well as substantial price increases may
take place even when the government’s
budget is fully in balance or shows a sur
plus. A balanced budget or preferably a
surplus is, however, a foundation measure
needed to support all stabilization pro
grams.
Unfortunately that foundation is proving

Economic Problems of Mobilisation

very difficult to secure. The tax increases
that are about to pass Congress likely will
not prevent substantial deficit in the fiscal
year 1952 and, unless heavily supple
mented by later tax legislation, a large
deficit in the fiscal year 1953. We are told
that this tax bill scrapes the bottom of the
tax barrel, and indeed that it has taken
the bottom itself. These remarks undoubt
edly refer to the political bottom of the
barrel rather than the economic bottom.
Fortunately, the political bottom, or the
political ceiling, to use another figure,
changes location from time to time. If the
past is repeated in the future, when the
public sees the need it will support sub
stantial further tax increases.
Several arguments against higher taxa
tion have common currency. One argu
ment is that taxes should not be increased
until unnecessary governmental spending
has been eliminated. Reducing govern
mental expenditures would of course help
to ease both the production and the sta
bilization problems. The reductions that
already have been made in nondefense ex
penditures are substantial, especially if
increasing costs are taken into account.
It is fully within the power of Congress
to reduce expenditures still more if it
chooses to do so. The rub comes in defin
ing “unnecessary.” Substantial reduction
in governmental spending can be achieved
only through reducing the programs of
services rendered. Critics who put their
emphasis on cutting personnel are attack
ing not the roots of the problem but only
the leaves. Personnel cannot be greatly
reduced if the programs are to be car
ried into effect, and even large personnel
cuts would affect only a small part of total
governmental expenditures. Virtually every
Federal spending program has the strong
organized support of groups of citizens
who consider that program to be essential.
To be sure, each group sees other pro
grams that it thinks should be reduced,
but these also have their defenders. When
the smoke clears away the amount of “un
necessary” expenditures lopped off is likely
to be disappointingly small.
It is not safe either to count on or to
wait for expenditure cuts to solve any
part of the stabilization problem. If after
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adequate tax increases are provided, sub
stantial expenditure reductions are actu
ally realized and result in a budget sur
plus, which is a most unlikely result, that
surplus will be highly desirable. Any tax
reductions that proved to be possible at
that time surely would not be resented by
taxpayers.
Another argument against higher taxes
is that they will damage the economy.
Some of the same persons said the same
thing in 1929 and in 1939 and no doubt
in other years before, between, and after
these. Since those dates, taxes have greatly
increased. The economy has also grown
to such an extent that most persons have
much more real income after taxes now
than they did then. Capital investment,
business profits after taxes, and the level
of living have all risen in real terms, after
adjusting for price changes. These facts
do not of course prove the falsity of claims
that further tax increases would damage
the economy, but they cast a good deal of
doubt on the reliability of such claims.
The relation of taxes to the economic
burden of the defense program is often
misunderstood. That economic burden con
sists of the goods that we must do with
out because resources must be used for
defense production rather than to produce
civilian supplies. Holding taxes down dur
ing the mobilization period will not make
any larger the supplies of goods and serv
ices which the public as a whole can
purchase, and increasing taxes, if care
fully done, will not reduce the supplies.
Tax increases do not increase the eco
nomic burden of the defense program;
they distribute it much more fairly than
does inflation. There seems to be no ques
tion that the economic burden of the pres
ent program can be borne, which is at
least prima facie evidence that the tax
burden to pay for it also can be borne.
A tax increase might be said to have
exceeded the economic limit if it had no
anti-inflationary effects. There is a sim
ple misunderstanding on this point that
ought to be cleared up. It is often said
that tax increases will not be anti-infla
tionary because the money will be spent
by government. The only case in which the
argument is valid is one in which the
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money would not be spent by the govern
ment unless the tax was levied. During
the mobilization period, however, expendi
tures will likely be made in the amounts
that are deemed necessary for national
security, with little if any regard for the
volume of taxes. Effects of expenditures
and effects of taxes are thus separate and
independent. The increasing of taxes would
thus reduce inflationary pressures by de
creasing spendable funds in the hands of
the public.
For a tax increase not to be anti-infla
tionary, one of three results would have
to follow its imposition. The tax rates
might be so high that incentives to work
and produce would be seriously reduced,
resulting in the supply of goods being
reduced as much as or more than the de
mand was reduced by the increased tax.
Or, the tax increase might put taxes so
high that the taxpayers would be outraged
and would literally force an increase in
their compensation regardless of controls
imposed to prevent it. Since controls and
taxes alike must fail unless there is gen
eral acceptance and cooperation by the
public, the whole stabilization program
might be threatened. Or, the tax increases
might so stimulate efforts to evade and
avoid payment that the collections would
not increase.
The political ceiling to taxation is likely
to be so far below the economic ceiling
that we scarcely need worry about raising
the general level of taxes too high for the
economy to carry. Tax increases of course
should not be permitted to be offset by
compensatory price or income increases
of the persons or businesses on which the
tax burden was intended to fall. More
over, we should be on the lookout for
signs that specific tax rates are being put
too high, since this might happen when
the general level of taxes was still well
below the economic limit.
An important obstacle to adequate taxa
tion is that each of various economic
groups believes that the tax burdens can
and should be pushed off on to other
groups. The resulting struggle takes the
form of resistance to specific tax increases,
and this in the aggregate is resistance to
tax increases generally.

It is unfortunate that the fight against
inflation is weakened by the seeming un
willingness of Congress, after its splen
did start in 1950, to provide adequate tax
revenues in 1951. The result is to make
more difficult the task of other stabiliza
tion programs. These programs must bear
a greater load and have less chance of
success when taxation is not adequate to
the need.
A second program for stabilization is
the increase of personal and business sav
ings. Saving is the nonspending of income;
and nonspending does not create infla
tionary pressures. To be effective against
inflation, savings must not be used to pur
chase such investments as housing, or in
ventories, or new capital equipment. Such
uses of saving increase demand just as
spending on consumer goods. To be most
effective against inflation, the savings
should either be held in cash or used to
buy Government securities. If other kinds
of securities are purchased or if debts are
repaid, the persons to whom the money
is paid must, in turn, either hold the funds
in cash or purchase government securi
ties, if the anti-inflationary effect of sav
ing is to be achieved. Money held in cash
has the disadvantage that it seems to burn
holes in some people’s pockets, so that
the saving may not be as permanent as
if the savings are held in some other form.
Buying government securities is a par
ticularly good way of holding savings be
cause the government can use the funds
to keep down its debts to banks, thereby
restricting the volume of money. The Sav
ings Bond campaign now under way
should be vigorously supported. Every ef
fort should be made to expand the amount
of savings done by the public in this
period of mobilization.
Several factors enter into the size of
personal savings. If you do not expect
prices will rise, you are likely to postpone
more spending and thus save more than
if you expect prices will rise. If you ex
pect goods will become scarce in the fu
ture, you will likely save less now than if
you expect a plentiful supply. Accord
ingly, the degree of inflationary pressure
that is expected is in itself a force affect
ing the rate of saving, which in turn
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affects inflationary pressure. Shortages of
such goods as durable consumers’ goods,
such as automobiles, washing machines,
refrigerators, and the like, if combined
with vigorous price control measures, may
in the months ahead create substantial
amounts of personal savings, since many
people would rather save their money to
be able to buy these goods in the future
than to use their whole incomes in buying
other kinds of goods.
Although very helpful, savings are not
as good an anti-inflationary measure as
are taxes, because adding to government
debt increases the cost of debt service and
may lead to future inflationary dangers.
Borrowing money to use in buying goods
is the reverse of saving; it has the effects
of negative saving. Therefore, to main
tain the maximum amount of net personal
and business saving, it is necessary to hold
down borrowing. The restriction of bor
rowing is the purpose of several of the
government’s anti-inflationary programs.
Selective credit controls are used to cut
down the amount of borrowing to buy
durable consumers’ goods and new houses.
Recently the Congress has seen fit to
weaken the application of these restraints.
A voluntary program of credit control and
certain other measures have been em
ployed to restrain the general expansion
of credit.
Still another program for stabilization
is that of direct controls of commodity
prices, wages, rents, etc. One of two mis
takes is commonly made in considering
price and wage controls.
On the one hand, it is a mistake to ex
pect too much from them. Some people
have assumed that the whole job of sta
bilization can be done simply by fixing
prices and wages. This view leaves out of
account the effects of the mobilization
program on the demand for and supply
of goods. Without being firmly backed up
by tax, credit, and savings programs, price
controls will lead, if effective, to empty
shelves and, if ineffective, to black mar
kets. Other stabilization programs to re
duce demand are important to make price
controls effective. Price controls need to
be effective if wage controls are to be
effective since otherwise the major burden
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of mobilization would be concentrated on
the wage-earning groups.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to
say that price and wage controls can do
no good at all, or that they necessarily do
more harm than good. Price and wage
controls can, in fact, make a major con
tribution to stabilization by restricting the
increase of incomes, and, by the same
token, restricting increases of costs. The
inflationary spiral is produced by two
forces: increased spending power, which
pushes prices up by raising demand, and
increased costs, which make it necessary
for sellers to raise their prices. An in
crease in one price leads to other price
rises throughout the economy, and prices
and wages are similarly interlocked. Price
controls and wage controls help to hold
down both incomes and costs, and thus
help to cut off the inflationary spiral.
Thus far I have described how the eco
nomic problems of mobilization are being
met through a comprehensive set of pro
grams directed toward achieving produc
tion goals and maintaining a stable econ
omy. Many of these programs, such as
the procurement, taxation, credit, and sav
ings programs, are entirely consistent with
the economic freedoms of more normal
times—freedoms which are a keystone of
our national policy and a foundation for
our national prosperity. Other programs
such as materials controls, price controls,
and wage controls, inevitably impair eco
nomic freedom and would not be used if
the situation did not require it. If con
tinued over a long period, such controls
could have serious effects on the economy.
But not using them during the intense
period of defense mobilization would
cause even more damage.
The success of the production programs
seems to be assured in the sense that the
economy clearly can and will produce what
is required under the present defense pro
gram. The success of the production pro
grams will always be relative, however,
since it is not likely that we shall pro
duce enough or produce it soon enough
to meet desirable goals.
The realization of the defense produc
tion programs will inevitably be at the
expense of other important segments of
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the economy. The production of consum
ers’ durable goods is being cut back. Struc
tural steel is in short supply, with the re
sult that commercial and other construc
tion are being sharply restricted. There
are other crucial shortages. Many state
and local improvement projects will prob
ably have to be postponed. The allocation
of scarce materials and other scarce re
sources certainly will never be solved to
the general satisfaction of the public.
Many projects of seemingly high prior
ity will have to be set aside until later.
It is simply impossible to take care of
them all. The problem is to see that the
cutbacks are intelligently made with a
broad view of the national interest in the
present emergency.
How successful the stabilization pro
gram will be depends on many factors,
some economic, some political. The re
laxation of inflationary pressures and the
resulting downward drift of many prices
over the past few months is very encourag
ing. But the growing defense expenditure
will be a powerful influence toward pro
ducing a new period of strong inflationary
pressure. There is no basic reason, how
ever, why the anti-inflation programs can
not be put in position to meet the pressure
successfully, if and when it comes.
Success in these programs, however, re
quires understanding support throughout
the country. In many respects this support
has been gratifying. Unfortunately, how
ever, thus far there is not much evidence
that the major economic groups are pre
pared to accept the sacrifices which suc
cessful stabilization requires — sacrifices
to be made with or without stabilization.
Stabilization means giving up increases
in income which we might otherwise re
ceive. It is not difficult to find people who
say they will give up increases in income
if they can be assured that their costs will
not go up, but usually they insist that all
cost increases falling upon them must be
allowed to be promptly reflected in higher
incomes to them. That is the doctrine of
escalation, which prevails in agricultural

prices that are not above parity, in indus
trial and mercantile prices under the re
cent revision of the Defense Production
Act, and in wage stabilization policy. In
sistence on escalation is a very understand
able point of view. But if, when controls
are first imposed, there is a lack of equili
brium among various prices and costs,
and if taxes, savings, and credit controls
are not sufficient to hold down demand,
how can we expect that prices and wages
will be fully stabilized under the escala
tion principle? Delays in applying esca
lation would be very helpful in holding
increases to a slow rate, as would other
methods of absorbing part of the cost in
creases instead of passing them all along
in price and wage increases.
The task of stabilization may be greatly
eased if the consuming public voluntarily
decides to save a larger per cent of its in
come than has been in the case in the past,
and if business reduces its plans for the
expansion of plant and equipment of the
less necessary types. However, it is not
safe to assume that relief will come from
these sources. The experience of the past
15 months indicates how easily a mass
movement can develop in an inflationary
direction. This is the time to keep our
stabilization machinery in absolutely firstclass running order with all the necessary
powers intact.
We need not look forward to an indefi
nite continuation of control programs.
They are most necessary during the pe
riod when the direction of production
must be changed and before the normal
growth of production has caught up with
the additional strain placed upon the
economy by the defense program. With a
defense program of the size planned, the
economy should gradually become ad
justed to the new situation, assuming that
adequate taxes and other general restraints
on demand are imposed. Then the direct
controls could be reduced or eliminated.
But that is a matter for the future. The
problem now is how to make the controls
more effective, not how to relax them.
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I
should like first to place them in a some
what broad context. At this moment there
is very vivid in my mind an occurrence
that happened two month ago in Berlin
when I visited that war-shattered center
of the cold war. It was the day on which
was conducted the parade of one million
boys and girls all living under Communist
rule. That day I personally observed thou
sands of these youths slip across the line
and come over to the American, to the free
section of Berlin. I observed their search
for information. I observed the eager man
ner in which they said, “We are told this
and we are told that. Now what is the
real truth about it?”
I observed a good many hundreds of
them as they gathered in the radio station
studio of RIAS, or “Radio Free Berlin,”
and how there the German commentators
and radio announcers of the free Berlin
station would answer their questions and
give them the information they sought, and
how these youths from communist-controlled Eastern Germany would raise these
many questions about what they were be
ing told, and about what was happening in
the rest of the world, and even about what
was happening to them inside the Iron
Curtain.
In the midst of one of these sessions, a
young lad from Saxony arose, and as he
made certain points and asked certain
questions, suddenly he said in his own
tongue, “Freedom is so precious. Freedom
is so precious.”
N SPEAKING OF FREEDOM AND FINANCE,

I
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I can report to you from around the
world that there is a rising awareness by
people everywhere that freedom is pre
cious, that it means so much in the happi
ness and the enjoyment and the fruitful
ness of life.
But one of the things I am most con
cerned about is that there is not as keen
an awareness and understanding of the
essential requirements for freedom. Free
dom is precious. People are becoming
aware of it; aware of it from the reports
of those who slip out from under the Iron
Curtain; aware of it from the reports of
people who dash across the line, like the
recent dramatic escape of the Czechoslo
vakian engineer who drove his train right
past the Communist border guards and
made it to freedom in the American zone
of Germany. They know that freedom is
precious from reports like that of the
Polish sailors who recently mutinied in
the Baltic Sea and got to Sweden and to
freedom. They know it from their observa
tions of the whole wide range of semi
regimented or nationally controlled states
on up to the reports that now come with
increasing frequency and corroboration
from the Soviet territory itself.
But frankly my great concern is that
people today do not recognize clearly the
essential requirements of freedom, of a
freedom that will endure, a freedom that
children can enjoy and carry on, and pass
on to their children. That is the kind of
freedom that I would discuss—especially
since I know full well the importance of
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your leadership in business and the world
of active affairs here in our America, which
is now the leading nation of the world,
populated by only one-sixteenth of the
world’s people, but producing one-third of
all the world’s goods and services.
The important point to remember with
respect to freedom is that freedom cannot
long be maintained unless it is true and
complete freedom. By that I mean economic
freedom as well as social and political and
religious freedom—freedom to buy and to
sell, freedom to produce and to manufac
ture, freedom to invest and to save, free
dom to work and to earn.
The economic freedoms, as has been
proved over and over again in the whole
sweep of history, are inseparable and indi
visible from any lasting, true freedom for
a people.
I speak of these things now very positive
ly, but not with any partisan spirit or
purpose. Rather my concern and my re
marks today are beyond party considera
tions, because actually in these funda
mental things, the country’s direction, the
country’s long-term actions cannot be de
cided by any one political party. Only if
the whole of the people understand the
essentials and hold firm to them, and in
so doing cause them to be embodied in the
policies of both parties, only under those
circumstances can the basic essentials of
freedom and democracy be maintained and
kept alive and vital through, not just years,
but through decades and generations.
If you pause to reflect on the early
history of our country and the great prin
ciples of freedom which the Founding
Fathers set forth, you will know that those
principles have been maintained and have
been held through a century and a half or
more because they became the very fabric
of America and thus were translated into
the platforms and policies of all the lead
ing political parties.
So it is with this sense of our nation’s
history that I now speak about the basic
fact of economic freedom—that it is indi
visible from a total, true, and lasting
freedom in America. It is with this sense
that I speak specifically and directly to
you about freedom and finance.
It is my conviction that we have been

evolving in America what I would describe
as a modern, dynamic, people’s capitalism,
and that this people’s capitalism is some
thing very different from a nationalized
economy or socialized state, and also very
different from the laissez-faire capitalism
of a time gone by. This modern people’s
capitalism is a dynamic economy. It
evolves. And it does so because it recog
nizes the strength and the rights of labor,
and the need for the breaking up of
monopolies and for a wide diffusion of
shareholding in capital structure. These
and many other distinctions characterize
the American business and financial scene
and make it different from the early sys
tems of capitalism abroad. These distinc
tive characteristics point to the contin
uation of a favorable evolvement of a
modern, dynamic, people’s capitalism here
in America. Nevertheless, our progress can
be halted. We can slip all to easily into
the tragic economic mistakes that have
wrecked other systems.
Two of these dangers and the means of
avoiding them are of very special and
direct concern to you. They are matters in
which your counsel, your advice, your
participation, and your efforts at shaping
public opinion are of very great moment.
Others I shall touch upon are also of con
cern to you, but they are more directly the
concern of other groups in the national
life of our America. In any case, none are
more important to any of us than the two
that I lay before you—the avoidance of in
flation and the maintenance of adequate
private reserves of capital for American
enterprise. The successful solution of these
two problems is essential for the continu
ance of true freedom in our nation and for
the favorable evolvement of our economic
system.
As to the first problem, it is tremendous
ly important for the long-term economic
freedom of a people that its currency, its
money, its media of exchange, shall re
main sound and shall inspire confidence,
that its value shall not be dissipated by a
continuous inflationary development. If any
economic system reaches a point at which
the people do not have confidence that the
insurance policies they have taken out will
at a future time buy their families an
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amount of goods and services that bears a
reasonable relationship to what currently
can be obtained for the funds invested in
those policies, interest in that form of sav
ing will disappear and the life and
strength of the economic system will be
seriously undermined.
If the people lose interest in savings,
which become a part of the capital forma
tion of a country, if they lose confidence in
the future value of the dollar units of their
savings, if they are fearful of the future
purchasing power of their savings, then
you have begun to undermine very seri
ously the economy of your country and,
indeed, have weakened the entire social
fabric.
And that is why I say to you that this
whole problem of inflation, the whole prob
lem of analyzing it, or, to be more specific,
of meeting defense needs and other related
needs and yet of keeping the country on a
sound financial basis, is at the very fore
front of the problem of insuring lasting
freedom for our people.
When is the point reached at which you
have too greatly dissipated the value of the
dollar, have too greatly depreciated the
currency? When is the point reached at
which you have carried inflation too far?
I do not believe any economist or finan
cier can put his finger on such a point.
Too many factors are involved—the psy
chology of the people, the relationship of
currency to productivity, and many others
equally complex. The tragic experiences
of other countries that have gone over the
brink and have seen their currency go to
pieces do not provide any exact rules for
determining the danger point in advance.
In inflation you do not know you have gone
too far until too late. You discover where
you are after you have slid over the edge.
Now economists may argue about when
you have gone too far in inflation, but all
experience says that when you get too close
to the edge, people suddenly shift their
psychology, and then it is too late. That
is why one of the grave concerns of this
country, with its world-wide responsibili
ties, with its vast and varied defense needs,
beset by all the difficulties caused by
wrong policies in the post war years and
burdened down by a vast debt must be
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alert against inflation. For the sake of the
dollar? Oh, no! For the sake of people
in business? Oh, no! For the sake of
financiers? Oh, no! Rather for the sake
of the freedom of the people of this
country and for their enjoyment of life
and their children’s enjoyment of life!
We must be alert to the importance of the
stability and soundness of the American
currency as a foundation stone of freedom
and democracy.
The second main point in this matter of
maintaining lasting freedom that I particu
larly want to discuss is: If there is to be
vitality and productivity in the long-term
economic development of a country, then
it is of tremendous importance that we
have in that country substantial pools of
investment capital in private hands with
the right of private citizens to invest it as
they see fit without permission of anyone
from government.
Here again many tragic experiences
throughout the world reveal what happens
to an economy when the only way a busi
ness can really develop and expand and
realize its potentialities is through the
kind permission of men in government.
This again is a question that goes beyond
any political party; it goes to the funda
mentals of government.
You can study the record in the Europ
ean countries, you can study the record in
the Asiatic countries; and when you see in
private hands substantial pools of capital,
whether they be controlled by individuals
or by groups of individuals organized
through some form of association or by
pooling through banks, or however the
control is exerted; when you see in pri
vate hands pools of capital, and risks be
ing taken, and money being invested with
out permission being asked of anyone in
government; then you see an economy
developing, you see productivity expanding
because of self-generating initiative. On
the other hand, when you see men in
government, regardless of how well-inten
tioned they are in the beginning, exercis
ing control in one way or another over all
the major sources of capital, then you see
an economy beginning to wither, produc
tivity beginning to decrease; and with
these beginnings come the multiplication
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and the acceleration of the inflationary
the world, here is one of the first places
pressures of a country.
the nation is lured into socialism, because
These then are the two specific things
nothing is easier than for the demagogue
that I lay before you for your considera to point to some huge industry, something
tion and attention in your own individual
remote and not understood by the people,
activities. I realize fully well that in a free
and say, “We just want to take this over
society policies of this kind are actually
for the benefit of the people.” Once it is
decided, not by political parties, not by
taken over, the additional power that that
public officeholders, but rather by the peo act places in the hand of men in govern
ple. The people make their decisions in
ment leads to other powers being sought
that intangible but definite way in which
by those men in government. Even though
public opinion takes form. The decisions
those who first take over an industry may
are made when the great body of the
be sincere, history shows that those who
public is influenced by the intelligent
subsequently come into government and
leadership that shows itself in discussions
control the industries use that power to
by those who are best informed. You, I
take more economic power from the
must point out, are a segment of the best
people. And once the balance shifts so
informed public. And therefore when finan that the major power of the people in
cial subjects are being considered, your
economic matters has been shifted to the
counsel and your informal discussions at
men in your government, then other free
luncheons, dinners, bridge parties, golf
doms are soon lost.
games, or wherever you may be, play a
Let me also call your attention to one
part in developing the public opinion of
more example of the way in which the
America on the essentials of financial
first step to the loss of economic freedom
policy, and by contributing to that develop has been taken in some countries. Or
ment you are affecting the future deci rather, let me state it this way: that for
sions of both political parties and of
the maintenance of lasting freedom it is
tremendously important that the retail
America.
Now, I will just briefly touch upon other
stores of the country be owned and operat
things that, in this economic field, are so
ed directly by the people as private citi
essential for freedom. As you observe what
zens and not by men in government.
happens around the world, the firm con
And finally, of course, and most import
viction comes to you that it is tremendous ant but inseparable from the rest, there
ly important that the farms of a nation be
are the traditional rights of freedom of
owned and controlled by the men who till
speech and of the press, freedom of voting,
the soil and not by the men of the govern and freedom of religion. These freedoms
ment. And it is tremendously important too,
must be maintained. Freedom is precious,
that the professions of a country, particu freedom is indivisible; and I trust we
larly the medical profession, be independ never forget that if men become dependent
ent professions and not strait-jacketed
on decisions by other men in government,
bureaucracies under a socialistic scheme of
as to what they may eat and what they
nationalized medicine or socialized medi may wear, as to where they may work
cine or any other kind of nationaliza and what they may earn, as to what they
tion of the professions of a country.
may build and what they may fabricate,
Similarly it is tremendously important
as to how they may invest and how they
that the schools of a country be under
may profit; if that day comes, then this
local control and not under a central,
precious freedom is soon lost, or is al
nationalized control, whatever the form of
ready lost.
government.
In spite of present world trends and the
It is also important that the great basic
problems of economic systems affecting
industries—steel and chemicals, oil and
freedom, I say to you that I appear before
utilities—should be in private hands and you today with optimism and I am still
not in the hands of the men who run the
confident in the future of our America, a
government. In some of the countries of nation of people who have true freedom.
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of certified
dollar every minute since the birth of
public accountants touch the defense
Christ, minus 49 years?
mobilization effort at many points, just as In round numbers, the cost of defense
mobilization will be fifty billions a year
they did in the days of World War IL
As a member of the War Production
for three years, or one hundred and fifty
billion dollars. It is difficult to visualize
Board, I know how the Institute and its
just how much that is. Our national debt
members helped procurement agencies on
contract negotiation, cost definition, rene is approximately 250 billion dollars. To
gotiation, and termination. You also helped
put that in another way, it is one-fourth
of a trillion. Most of us still shy away
prepare accounting manuals for the Armed
Forces and government agencies. You
from that word “trillion.” Yet, to use a
helped Selective Service and the War
more comforting figure, the total value of
Manpower Commission in the allocation
goods and services produced in the United
of accounting personnel. You aided the
States last year exceeded 300 billion dol
Office of Price Administration to formu lars. It was close to one-third of a trillion.
late its financial reporting procedure.
Along with these Buck Rogers figures
In the simpler days of our nation, ’way
come complicated laws and regulations
back in the eighteenth century, a man
which need trained interpretation and cal
could count on his fingers, or use an
culation. In the last ten years, the number
abacus. But now we deal in figures that
of CPAs has almost doubled, but the de
mand for them is still growing.
are borrowed from astronomy. You ac
Defense Mobilization has produced
countants are needed to see that astron
many new accounting problems, and I
omy does not degenerate into astrology.
In the course of many years, as an offi
know you would like to have me tell you
how best to cope with the orders of the
cer of that little company I was connected
Office of Price Stabilization and the
with, I became accustomed to thinking in
rules of the National Production Author
terms of millions of dollars. But now I
ity. You would like to know the most
must think in terms of billions. I haven’t
efficient way of applying for a certificate
been able to become used to it. I find
of necessity for rapid tax amortization. You
myself saying “millions” when I mean
would be glad to have a thorough ex
“billions.” I haven’t been in Washington
planation of the procedure in wage and
long enough to get used to billions—let’s
salary stabilization. You would like to
hope I won’t be there that long. It’s really
know if all your bright young men are
hard to understa
nd what one billion dol
going to be taken by Selective Service, or
lars means. Do you know that spending
whether deferments will be granted. You
one billion dollars means spending one
he brains and the skill
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would appreciate information on how to
advise your clients to cooperate in the
defense effort.
I feel, however, that you are even more
interested in getting from me an over-all
look at defense mobilization—where we
stand and where we’re going. We are liv
ing in an age when anything can happen
—and usually does. We are fighting a
good-size war against communism in
Korea—yet it is only one of many places
in the world where trouble already exists
or is threatened. The French are fighting
Communists in Indo-China, the British in
Malaya. In addition to open warfare, the
free countries are being attacked by in
filtration, subversion, espionage, and de
ceptive propaganda.
All of this fits into a pattern of world
conquest as dreamed up in the Kremlin,
because, as Stalin has said, quoting Lenin,
our kind of civilization cannot live side
by side with the Soviet Union. We have
tried to deal with the Communists in
numerous ways, but without success. They
have broken promises, flouted treaties, and
scorned civilized usages. The Communists
helped organize the United Nations at
San Francisco in 1945, but ever since then
their actions have been calculated to
harass and defeat the UN’s efforts to bring
about harmony among nations.
A classic example of the difficulties of
dealing with Communists is the exasperat
ing course of the truce talks at Kaesong.
They began early in July, nearly three
long months ago, and there is still no sign
of settlement. Armistice talks in World
War I consumed only five days. Two days’
negotiation were enough to bring about
cease-fire order in Europe in World War
II. Four days’ talk brought about the end
of shooting in the Pacific. But after nearly
ninety days of palaver, the Korean war
still goes on. It has long been obvious
that the only diplomacy that impresses the
Communists is the diplomacy of strength.
If the United Nations had not used its
strength in Korea, that unhappy penin
sula long ago would have been taken over
by the Reds, and their huge armies would
have been released for use elsewhere.
We are now building America’s indus
trial power to equip a mighty Army,

Navy, and Air Force, and to assist our
allies in the free world to strengthen their
defenses. We are also creating production
lines and standby facilities that can be
brought quickly into action in any emer
gency. At the end of this three-year pe
riod, we should be strong enough not only
to meet any challenge, but to discourage
any challenge from being made. For the
supreme objective of defense mobilization
is not to fight a war, but to prevent one.
As I have often said, the nation is taking
out an insurance policy against World
War III.
There are those who fear that the result
of an armament race is likely to be war,
rather than otherwise. But if we look back
at history, we find that war has often
been the result of unpreparedness. In 1939,
neither England nor France was prepared
for the war that Hitler started, and it may
well be doubted that Hitler would have
dared to precipitate World War II if they
had been well-armed.
In any event, what alternative do we
have except to build America’s might? A
fat, lazy, and militarily weak Uncle Sam
would be duck soup for Soviet Russia.
As General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief
of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, said in a
recent address: “Among nations as among
men, the best protection against a criminal
is the power and the determination to
strike back swiftly and decisively. Today
the people of the United States have the
determination and they are building the
power.”
Defense mobilization is now moving into
high gear. The first half of 1951 was de
voted largely to contract-signing, the draw
ing of specifications and blueprints, the
tooling-up of industries, and the other
birth pains that are the necessary pre
liminary to mass production. In the three
months from July through September, de
liveries of military goods totaled more
than five billions. This was four times the
rate just before Korea.
This is a stream that will soon become
a torrent. We are getting heavy and me
dium bombers, light and medium tanks,
guns of all kinds, electronic fire control
systems, various types of rockets, while
the Navy has completed modernization of
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a number of warships. The delivery rate
from here forward is plotted on a con
stantly ascending curve. It will reach a
peak of $4 billions a month in the first
half of 1953.
You saw production miracles during
World War II. You are about to witness
them again. You will see not only volume
production in the best American tradition,
but you will also see the result of superior
methods and new technological processes
developed since the last war ended. The
new weapons will have refinements in op
eration in the interest of speed and accu
racy, as well as unbelievable punishing
power.
Of course, we are having some tempo
rary disappointments and difficulties. Of
course, we are having to smash bottle
necks and to cope with scarcities. You
know how we had to move in various ways
to overcome the shortages of machine
tools, which lie at the very heart of any
mass production effort. The machine tool
industry fell into the doldrums at the end
of the war. It needed price incentives,
super-priorities for raw materials, and new
manpower. It is getting these things, so
that it may attack its backlog of orders
with vigor and confidence.
The scarcity of raw materials, particu
larly metals, is a continuing problem. This
was foreseen and long ago we took steps
to increase the supply of steel and alu
minum. Part of our scarcity problem arises
from the expansion of these industries. It
takes steel to build new steel and alumi
num plants. But this is bread cast upon
the waters, and it has already begun to
return to us in the form of increased pro
duction.
Copper presents a special problem. Our
entire domestic supply, plus what we are
able to buy from Chile, is not sufficient
to meet our needs. We are seeking new
copper development in Nevada, Arizona,
South America, and Alaska, but it will be
a long time before the metal from these
sources will begin to flow to industry. In
the case of rubber, imports of natural
rubber are being largely augmented by
our synthetic plants. Oil drilling and re
fining goes on at an accelerated pace, and
large increases are being made in power
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production. Thus, to meet the demands of
defense mobilization, we are increasing
our entire productive base. This is just
another example of the dynamic quality
of the American system, and of its abil
ity to spurt ahead under pressure.
Not many years ago, there were those
who contended that our economy had al
ready reached a condition of maturity.
That implied that arterio-sclerosis was
about to set in. How false that diagnosis
was is shown by the record of the last
decade. First, we accomplished the stu
pendous task of production for World
War II, providing for our huge forces
both in Europe and in the Pacific, besides
sending billons of dollars of goods to our
Allies under lend-lease. Next, we con
founded the so-called experts who pre
dicted a recession after the war. Instead
of the long line of unemployed that was
forecast, industry and commerce moved
smoothly from war to peace production
and, instead of post-war depression, we
had a post-war boom. The year 1950 was
a record-breaker for civilian production.
Now we are rearming on a gigantic
scale, and we are able to do so while
maintaining civilian production at high
levels. When all of the new expansion
plans have been completed and are in
place, we shall be ready to write a new
and glowing chapter in the history of the
Industrial Revolution. Barring another
world war, the future of America can be
splendid and magnificent. Our people can
enjoy even higher standards of living and
the fruits of our industrial progress can
spread throughout the world.
But at this point I must warn that, if
we are to enjoy material benefits, they
must be accompanied by spiritual values
and by rugged qualities of character. We
cannot accomplish the objectives of de
fense mobilization without sacrifices and
restraints. As military production bites
deeper into our capacity, there will be
temporary shortages of civilian goods.
Higher taxes will have to be paid. Regu
lations regarding prices and wages will
have to be observed. Individuals will have
to make decisions of many kinds con
cerning their own actions, and the ques
tion they should have constantly in mind
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is: “Will it help or harm the nation’s ef
fort?”
The defense mobilization program could
be wrecked by runaway inflation, and
whether or not we have runaway inflation
depends to a large extent on the policies
of the large pressure groups—industry,
labor, agriculture. Will they use restraint
or will they jockey for individual advan
tage? Will they accept reasonable prices
and wages, or will they seek to upset the
balances that the government is trying
to achieve in the interest of stabilization?
We are now enjoying a period of rel
ative calm on the price-wage front. The
freeze order of last January has had the
most salutary results. In the last seven
months the consumers’ price index rose
less than 1 per cent. Of course, other
factors besides the freeze order have con
tributed to this result, such as the piling
up of huge inventories and the fact that
people are saving instead of spending. But
the January freeze, however imperfect it
was, had a tremendous psychological ef
fect. When people believe that prices will
rise, they will buy even if they don’t need
the goods. If they see prices steady they
are more willing to buy only what they
need.
Whereas there were no real shortages
when the 1950-1951 panic buying oc
curred, we are now entering a period when
inflation pressures will be real rather than
psychological. There will be fewer things
to buy and more purchasing power in
the hands of the people. Then will come
the real test of the numerous safeguards
that have been erected against inflation.
I am happy to say that Congress is
now reconsidering some of the weakening
amendments that were added to the De
fense Production Act when it was passed
last July. One of these amendments tends
to upset the whole price structure, as
applied to manufacturers, which the Of
fice of Price Stabilization has worked out
after many months of careful considera
tion. It has been called an accountants’
dream. I think it should be called instead
an accountants’ nightmare.
I have complete confidence in the na
tion’s genius for production. If, at the
same time, we can exercise the restraints

and the self-discipline to keep the econ
omy stabilized, we will have met the
test imposed upon us in these critical
times.
I have spoken of spiritual values and
I don’t know how better I can explain
what I mean than to repeat to you an elo
quent statement I heard at New York
University last June. The speaker was
Acting Chancellor James L. Madden. Mr.
Madden told the blessings that had been
heaped upon our country and he said:
“There must also be a revival of spiritual
values in our daily lives, if our industrial
mobilization is to be fully effective. As
America has been growing over the years,
too many of our people have drifted from
the religious concepts of their forefathers.
They failed to realize that no nation
can be truly great which lacks spiritual
strength.
“Men will die for their spiritual be
liefs because of their implicit faith in the
Almighty. Accordingly, now is the time
for a revival of interest in the faiths of
our fathers, and for greater efforts to put
into daily practice the teachings of our
respective faiths. America’s greatness
traces back to God-fearing men and we,
like our forefathers, should ask for His
blessing and guidance in our efforts to
safeguard our country and to build even
more solidly for the future. Let us keep
in mind that Benjamin Franklin once
said: ‘God governs in the affairs of men.’ ”
So our defense mobilization is not a
slide-rule operation or one whose begin
ning and end is to see how many weapons
of war can be turned out of our factories.
It is an exercise of faith—faith in the
right of man to enjoy the precious qual
ities of freedom and justice. We can no
longer take freedom or justice for granted,
as gifts handed to us by the blood and
sacrifice of our forefathers. The lights of
freedom and justice are going out all
over the world where the shadow of Com
munism has fallen. We are going to have
to fight and strive to keep them alive, be
cause without them life is not worth liv
ing. If the nation will tackle the task of
defense mobilization imbued with that
great ideal, there need be no fear about
the outcome.
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people in something so unpopular as
on civilian economy is unbelievably
price control, price stabilization, some
great. You just cannot go into this sortthing so uncertain at the moment. It is
of defense effort without having great ef extremely difficult to get really good ac
countants willing to come in, to take such
fect upon your work as you go among
your clients and as you prepare the re a heavy responsibility, and to take the
ports and do the work of your office. It
pounding that they have to take as they
try to do their work.
is certainly true that runaway prices mean
We have a problem in getting people
runaway costs, for both the military and
civilian activities of the government.
to understand. Accounting-wise, OPS
Former Secretary Marshall of the De works with the problems not of one com
partment of Defense pointed out that sev
pany, not of companies in one industry,
but with the accounting problems of prac
eral billions of dollars have already been
tically all companies. It is difficult for
lost in the defense budget simply through
the accountant who comes to see us about
price increases. Ships and planes and
tanks and guns are lost just as effectively
his own particular client, or the busi
nessman who comes about his own par
through price increases as if they were
ticular problem, to understand that the
lost on the sea or on the field of battle.
decisions we make, the policies we follow,
The Russians are counting on inflation to
and rules we make, have to be so de
ruin and demoralize us so that their
agents can take us over from within. In
signed and so administered that they will
serve for all companies.
my opinion, America can be invincible
I report that our greatest problem on
if the economic and the industrial sys
these critical issues is to get a simple
tems are maintained on a stable basis.
objective statement of the truth. What
In language that you and I understand,
we need, and need so badly, is the truth,
accountant’s language, I think we can
the whole truth, and nothing but the
put it this way: that our greatest asset
truth.
is a stable economy.
The accounting operation in OPS is
The subject of this session is mobiliza
administered through an office of ac
tion problems. I am supposed to talk
counting. It is one of eight components
about problems that we have in our part
of the mobilization effort in price stabili in the agency and it stands on equal
zation and in accounting for price stabili footing with the other components of the
zation. Certainly we do have problems;
agency. We have accountants stationed
we have many diverse and great ones.
in each of the types of offices that the
We have the problem of getting enough
agency has. In the national office, at
he impact of the defense program
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the present time, we have about 150 ac
countants. We have a budget of 300 there.
We have 14 regional offices, 13 for the
continental United States and 1 for the
territories, and there are accountants sta
tioned in each of them. We have, at the
moment, I believe, about 85 district offices
spread throughout the United States and
some of the territories, and there are ac
countants stationed at each of them. J
will not say much about how we work
beyond that, except to say that, in OPS
accounting, we have to operate as an
accounting firm. Some of your firms have
worked with us in one way or another
and I think you generally understand.
We believe that there are certain prin
ciples we must follow. In other words,
we are not, we hope, just floundering;
we think that there are certain principles
that we have to follow. First of all, be
fore we can do anything, we have to
be sure of this independent position of
accounting; that is the only way we be
lieve it will work. We have to fight off
any attempts to infringe on that inde
pendence. We have had our difficulties
and we shall probably continue to have
them, but we have had great and strong
consistent support from the Institute.
We are responsible for all accounting.
In other words, accounting decisions that
are made in Seattle, San Francisco, Min
neapolis, Boston, or Washington, are made
under the same set of rules of procedure,
and we hope that they are consistent.
We rely on generally accepted accounting
principles consistently applied. Those are
old words but they are important words.
We do not try, and will not try, to tell
any company how to do its accounting.
That is not the function of OPS account
ing. Attempts have been made to jockey
us into that position but we have so far
successfully resisted them.
We believe it is a basic right of the
accountant to set forth the facts as he
finds them, and we believe further that
the OPS accountant has as great free
dom to enjoy that basic right as any ac
countant in the world today. That is a
strong statement, but we believe it to be
true. We believe that the freedom to en
joy that right, to set forth the facts as

they actually are, as he finds them, is
just as great in OPS accounting as it
is in your own particular firm.
We believe it is important to maintain
sound and consistent accounting policy.
In other words, these accounting deci
sions cannot be made one by one. They
all have to be made within a framework
of accounting policy and we believe fur
ther that if that basic policy is sound,
and if our accounting executives make
their decisions within the framework of
that policy, it will not matter how many
years later we come back to review that
question, or to look at the problem again;
given the same set of facts, and follow
ing the same good accounting and good
judgment, the answer will be the same.
I constantly tell the members of the staff,
“If you can operate on that basis, you
don’t have to worry about investigations,
you don’t have to worry trying to re
member what you did.” It is almost iden
tical with telling the truth. You don’t
have to remember what you said. We
don’t have to remember what we did.
Given the same set of facts, we are
reasonably sure we will come out with
the same answer whether it is one year
later, two, ten, or twenty years later.
Accounting is growing in importance
in the administration of price control or
price stabilization. Early attempts at price
control, both in OPA and in OPS, in
volved the freeze technique where you
simply say that prices are frozen as of
a certain time. You know, and I know,
that that does not call for any account
ing. There are no accounting problems
in that method.
From that we get into industry sur
veys where we go out to a hundred com
panies, possibly—sometimes, when we
get into retailing, we get as many as a
thousand companies. We go out and try
to pick up their costs, bring them to the
particular office working on the case and
get them out so that the price executive
has some basis on which to take his ac
tion. Those studies are made (I insist)
objectively because we don’t know what
the answer is supposed to be and we
are not trying to develop accounting facts
to back up or prove anything. We are
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trying to find out what the facts are.
We also review submitted cost compu
tations. When your clients send in their
figures to OPS, in all probability, some
one in the accounting department will
take a look at them. We handle indi
vidual hardship cases where somebody
cannot live under present regulations and
he asks for relief. We do accounting for
enforcement examinations and it is im
portant I think, that the enforcement in
vestigators, enforcement executives, and
the accountants are separate and distinct.
We also are responsible for maintaining
agency accounting policy.
Now, as to our problems, I cannot cite
all the problems we have, but I can cite
a few of them for you. We might ask at
what cost level should price control be
administered. Should it be on the basis
of direct material and direct labor? In
other words, direct cost or primary cost?
Well, we undertook to do that and we
called some twenty-five leading comp
trollers to Washington and, in an all-day
discussion, we asked them if they could
identify direct material and direct labor.
If you read the cost accounting text
books, of course that is the foundation
of cost accounting. I suppose you call
it the foundation of cost accounting. These
twenty-five comptrollers said, “No, we
can’t, in our companies, identify direct
material and direct labor.” We submitted
this proposition to them: If you were to
throw all your costs up in the air and
let them come down to the table, wouldn’t
the direct costs fall in one pile and the
indirect in the other? They thought about
that for awhile and then they said, “No,
this is not true. If you throw them all
up in the air they will come down and
it may be possible for you to separate
them into two groups but we do not be
lieve that our companies can separate
direct material from indirect material or
direct labor from indirect labor.”
As a result of that we came out with
Regulation 22. I don’t want to cite regula
tions here, but that one is so important
that I shall have to mention it. It is based
upon almost total material cost and almost
total labor cost. In other words, it spills
over direct cost to a point beyond and gets
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into the indirect factory expense. Do we
stop there? Maybe not. Maybe we go to a
factory cost. Do we stop there? Possibly
not. We go on to the total cost. That is one
type of problem we have.
Another type of problem is, do we work
with the whole industry, or do we bring it
down to one company and then do we work
with the whole company or do we bring it
down to one plant or one division, or do
we bring it down to a product line such as
refrigerators, or do we bring it down to a
single product?
Another problem is, at what point does
hardship develop? Many companies seem
to feel that they get into difficulty, but
what would the ground rules be to deter
mine when a company actually experiences
hardship? When the rate of profits does
not hold up, or when profits do not hold
up in total amount, or when there is a
failure to make any profit at all—that is,
to break even—or when there is a failure
to earn factory costs, or when there is a
failure to earn direct costs? Answers to
these questions must be found.
We also have a problem of trying to
convince people that we are not an agency
designed to control profits. We go before
the Congress, and we are attacked bitterly
because we are attempting to control pro
fits, or so it is said. Of course, the agency
points out that it is trying to control
prices. That is its purpose. But there is a
failure to recognize that revenue, cost, pro
fits, are all part of the over-all picture, and
particularly when you get into an industry
earnings standard—as we did in OPA and
we had until a short time ago in OPS—it
is very difficult to keep away from the
charge of profit control. I am personally
convinced that any attempt to control
prices or to stabilize prices, if you will,
may be subject to criticism, or probably
will be subject to the criticism that it is
trying to control profits.
OPA gradually—this is the old agency
now, the wartime agency—gradually
moved toward more and more reliance on
accounting determinations. During the war
years, you could see this thing develop.
There was an increasing reliance upon
accounting data. For good or for bad,
OPS started where OPA left off. From the
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start, heavy reliance was put upon account
ing. Current legislation puts the test
squarely on accounting. You have all read
about OPS difficulties in the newspapers.
Current legislation puts price stabilization
squarely on the basis of a accounting. It
has gone so far that accounting definitions
are written into price stabilization legisla
tion. “Upon application and a proper
showing of his prices and costs by any
person subject to a ceiling price, the Presi
dent shall adjust such ceiling price in the
manner prescribed. . . .” Does that mean
one product? Ten products? One com
pany, ten companies, or what does it
mean? It goes on to say, and I am quoting,
“ . . . the term ‘Costs’ includes material
indirect and direct factory labor, factory,
selling, advertising, office, and all other
production, distribution, transportation,
and administration costs, except such as
the President may determine to be unrea
sonable and excessive.” Now, as an ac
countant, how would you like to administer
that?
The important thing is not what that
statement says (and we could discuss it
and argue about it for a long time, I
suppose) but that that statement is there.
Does that lead to something else? To you,
as leading practitioners, I think it is ex
tremely important that that statement is
there and legislates (in a sense) account
ing. The President has requested the Con
gress to repeal this provision of the Act.
The case is now before the Congress for
further consideration.
We have certain difficulties, many diffi
culties, as we go along trying to get legisla
tion that is workable. We have difficulty in
understanding what this provision means.
Our lawyers interpret it one way, and then
they begin to see that maybe it should be
interpreted some other way. As account
ants, we get certain interpretations out of
it, but the important thing is that it is not
clear. It is difficult for us to try to operate
on a basis of adjusting the price of each
product, on a basis of the total costs of
each particular product.
During OPA, where we had experience
with 187 thousand companies—and we had
something on their accounting records—
we found, in 1946, that only 15 per cent of

American companies break down total
costs by products. We guessed, at that
time, that probably 25 per cent of the pro
duction of American companies could be
covered on that basis on the theory (or
principle) that the bigger companies have
somewhat better cost accounting than the
smaller ones although, I hasten to add, not
as much better as you and I are apt to
think. We have no reason to believe that
those conditions have changed very much.
The National Association of Manufacturers
claims OPS overstates the difficulties of
breaking down total costs by products.
This is at variance with what we have
found company experience to be, and at
complete variance with what top company
accountants tell us.
The top accountants, comptrollers, and
financial vice-presidents, come in to talk
this over with us and they say, “You can
not do it that way. There are not enough
accountants in the country to do it, and the
results would not be very reliable.” But,
when it is set down on paper, the paper
statement does not say what the top ac
counting executives have told us.
Now, there is something wrong. I don’t
know what it is. It is almost impossible to
get an objective statement from industrial
accountants on the subject because of the
difficulty of separating accounting facts
from other facts on the possibility of get
ting an increase in prices. I think that that
is not a good situation for accountants. I
think these things have an important effect
on accounting and, in order to bring out
that point, I want to refer, for a moment,
to the field of economics and the profes
sion of the economist.
With the entrance of the federal govern
ment into economic and industrial affairs
some fifteen years ago, economics became
much more important and the economist
had a much bigger job to do. There was a
tremendous increase, both in the amount of
the economic work to be done, and in the
importance attached to the economic pro
fession. At the same time there was a
rapid increase in the number of persons
who became expert economists. They were
not economists before, but they saw the
opportunity there and they suddenly be
came experts in the field. Many of the
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decisions which have caused us trouble
have come from that type of person. It has
been increasingly difficult to keep sepa
rate economic and political considerations.
This has led to the development of a
situation in which an economist can no
longer feel that he is safe from being
branded an exponent of something or other
as he goes about his work. In other words,
when an economist makes a statement to
day, he is likely to have the black mark
of something attributed to him because he
is accused of having some ulterior motive.
There is also an increasing difficulty in
getting a completely objective and reliable
statement on matters of economics in pres
ent-day commerce. Although this situation
may have made more jobs for economists,
and may have directed more attention to
them, in my opinion, it has hurt the pro
fession of economics. You have all seen
that develop.
Let us look at accounting. Accounting is
rapidly increasing in importance in the af
fairs of the federal government. The legis
lation to which I have just referred will
show that. There is a tremendous increase
in the importance of accounting as a
science, and of accountants in their profes
sion. There is a rapid growth in the num
ber of persons who call themselves ac
countants. Now, just as ten or fifteen years
ago, I see this in Washington—you prob
ably see it in other places—you had this
crop of expert economists jump up and
start to make decisions, you now have
expert accountants appearing. Within our
agency and in other places, there is a
great tendency for people to become
experts in the field of accounting who
never thought of accounting before it in
creased in importance. There may now be
an increasing difficulty to keep separate
accounting and political considerations.
Will a situation develop in which the
accountant can no longer feel that he is
safe from being branded as an exponent
of something or other as he goes about his
work? There is already some indication
of increasing difficulty to get a completely
objective and reliable statement on ac
counting matters from a present-day ac
countant. If these things come true, it will
be a sad day for the individual accountant
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and for his professional society, the AIA.
The American Institute of Accountants
has helped us as we have gone along. We
have relied on many of your firms, your
larger firms. We hired six public account
ing firms to do accounting work for the
Office of Price Stabilization when it looked
as though the job was getting too big for
us. My decision to use public accountants,
in that sense, was reversed by my supe
riors and we had to call them off before
their work was done, but they did come
in, and those firms know our problems.
You may be interested to know—I think
this is a bad sign, but it happened—that,
while one of the most respected firms in
your profession was working for OPS, a
practicing accountant from a New England
state wrote both his State Senators and
his Congressman that this was perfect sit
uation for this leading public accounting
firm to steal his clients. That came from a
practicing accountant and the letters were
turned over to us—to our office. It was
shocking, but it actually happened.
The Institute has offered to help us in
many ways. All during the war, The Journal
of Accountancy supported objective treat
ment of accounting data and backed us one
hundred per cent, for which I shall always
be grateful. The Institute subcommittee on
price stabilization has offered its help, but
I want to point out that we don’t need help
so much on the individual regulations—de
ciding what is acceptable cost and what is
not, or how to handle this particular item
or that one. We do need help on the
broader issues, the broader issues that
affect us and affect the Institute.
Just recently I arranged for five leading
practitioners, one from each of five public
accounting firms, to come to Washington
to testify before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee, on accounting truth
or accounting fact. These men offered to
go through considerable personal sacrifice
to do that. When we got to that point,
somebody had to arrange for these people
to come. In other words, either the Com
mittee had to ask them, or they had to ask
to be heard. It seemed to me that the
Institute was the logical place to have that
request originate. My call was made
when the Executive Committee was in ses
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sion, and the request went before that
committee. The decision of the American
Institute Executive Committee was that
this was not a matter on which accountants
could ask to be heard.
To me, the important thing is that ac
counting is so much the foundation of
national affairs that someone must speak
for it. Someone has to speak for the ac
counting profession on these matters. I
can go even beyond that. I can say that, at
the present time, accounting is so import
ant in the international affairs of this
Government that it should be of concern
to you, to me, and to all accountants. We
practice what we preach on that. Some of
the people in the audience know of a case
where we practically forced the downfall
of a foreign government on the right to
audit objectively. We finally won our point,
but it had to be carried to the point of a
cabinet crisis and it almost forced the
downfall of a government. We thought,
and we still think, that the issue was
important enough to follow it that far. We
think, and we continue to think, that on
these important issues in accounting, some
body must speak for accounting. I cannot
help but insist that the responsibility is
here and that the opportunity is knocking
so loudly it can be heard in many places.
I have certain suggestions, if I may offer
them, to the modern professional account
ant, growing out of our experience in price
stabilization accounting. I hope the ac
countant will recognize that the great im
portance of the American industrial sys
tem is that it is the great weapon of the
free world. It is really the last weapon of
the free world—how the American com
panies operate, and their ability to do
things, to turn out these products that are
so badly needed. Realize the tremendous
importance of professional accounting in

the successful operation of that industrial
system! I think the day is past when the
accountant can box off a little area and
say, “I shall not step outside of that.” Do
everything posible to support objective
treatment of technical accounting problems
when they are a basis of national policy
and refuse to admit that there is no room
for continued and rapid progress in the
accounting area.
I think American accounting, particular
ly cost accounting, has been overrated. I
think that it has been given credit for
being better than it is. I don’t think that
it has been given as much credit as it
should have for the progress it has made.
It is my own opinion that there is just as
much room for research, for advance, in
accounting and finance as there is in the
fields of science and engineering. You
hear, and I hear, about the great advances
that come in physics, chemistry, and engi
neering, and what they will do for the
world. I insist that the problems and the
opportunities are all around us. There is
just as much opportunity for research and
advancement in the fields of accounting.
finance, and management.
In conclusion, I should like to leave
these thoughts: OPS accounting needs the
full help and cooperation of the Institute
and of all its members, and we are sincere
in that request. OPS accounting asks for
understanding of its problems and the
chance to have them reviewed on an objec
tive basis. OPS accounting believes that,
if accounting is going to hold its gains and
continue to advance as a basis for national
policy decisions, leadership must be taken
by the American Institute of Accountants.
OPS accounting holds that the time has
arrived for the American Institute of Ac
countants to boldly go forth in its most
important role as The Merchant of Truth
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of the Depart
achieved in this country short of total
ment of Defense is being developed war. The build-up has not been com
and geared to our foreign policy. Aspleted but is well under way.
General Bradley recently remarked, “For
First, I think it might be helpful if we
eign policy is the expression of a nation’s
took a look at the primary goal of our
instinct for survival. Military policy com
present effort. Secretary Marshall in ap
prises the practices of a people in the
pearing before the Senate Appropriations
organization of their . . . resources for
Committee last December put it this way:
defense. There is little immediate danger
“This is a move to place us in a strong
of this country being over-run—but our
position from which we can go forward
way of life, our freedom, and our nation
rapidly to the extent necessary. This is
have the chance for survival by keeping
not full mobilization. This is a raising up
peace in the world.”
of the whole establishment to gain mo
This is the overriding consideration of
mentum from which we can open the
our national foreign and military policies.
throttle and go very quickly in any re
These policies are united in three basic
quired direction. In my own opinion, and
objectives: first, to protect and maintain
that of my associates, the way to build
our form of government and our way of
up to full mobilization, if that eventually
life against any challenge; second, to
is necessary, is first to get this partial
seek peace by every honorable means at
mobilization program straightened out and
our command; third, to assure peace not
put it on a very high level—you might
only for ourselves but for others. For
say a high plateau—and to do it as
these reasons we support the United Na
quickly, effectively, and efficiently as pos
tions, realizing that world peace is an
sible.”
integral part of American security. These
A concise statement of the objectives
guiding principles govern our actions in
and the atmosphere in which this initial
Korea as well as in our North Atlantic
policy decision was made appeared in a
Treaty efforts in Europe. We joined in
Washington Post editorial at the time of
the North Atlantic Treaty as a collective
Secretary Marshall’s retirement—in these
defense effort for mutual security. In col
words:
lective action we multiply our defense
“When the present emergency oc
strength.
curred, Secretary Marshall kept his head,
Since June 1950 the efforts of the
and resisted the hysterical cry of the full
United States in this collective action have
mobilizers. For that service alone the
been to build military strength with an
country owes him a great debt. It was a
intensity of effort equal to any ever
gamble he took, but it was a statesman
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like gamble. Secretary Marshall did not
want to mobilize men with only broom
sticks to train with. What he aimed at,
and what we are getting, is a steady,
coordinated, and harmonious partial mo
bilization, with the country wedded to a
civilian economy as well as to a civilian
leadership, and an economy which more
over, can cope with the military services
as a permanent rather than a spasmodic
customer.”
This concept carries out General Brad
ley’s thought that “through proper and
sustained preparedness by the United
States and with similar efforts by the free
nations associated with us, we may avoid
the period of an all-out war.”
Partial mobilization, under this concept,
means the maintenance of a military force
in the neighborhood of 3.5 million men.
It means providing such a force with
modern equipment at the earliest prac
ticable date, together with certain re
serve and mobilization stocks. It means
also the early delivery of such additional
equipment and supplies as would be nec
essary for them to undertake combat op
erations if required by action of an
aggressor.
As most of you realize, the build-up and
support of forces of this size requires the
procurement of literally hundreds of thou
sands of items. The determination of the
number of items required for the initial
equipment of forces of a specific number
of air wings, divisions, or ships is a rel
atively simple though laborious task. The
problem, however, of determining the
quantity of items to be procured for com
bat consumption in Korea, for the main
tenance of adequate pipelines, for reserve
and mobilization stocks is a tremendous
task. Once the total quantities have been
determined, individual items must be
scheduled for desired delivery dates.
Sources of supply and feasibility of pro
duction must be ascertained and checked
against the availability of raw materials,
some of which may be in critical supply.
Throughout all of this process the appli
cation of good judgment is vital.
In undertaking this program certain
ground rules were established. First, the
principle was adopted that once the ap

proved active forces were raised and pro
vided with modern equipment, and cur
rent operating stocks were on hand, max
imum feasible reliance would be placed
on continuing expansible production
rather than on huge accumulations of re
serve and mobilization stocks, particularly
those stocks which might be subject to a
high degree of obsolescence.
Accordingly, the basic objective of the
military procurement program is to supply
the services, the material, and equipment
required for the timely accomplishment
of the respective missions. In doing so
every effort is being made to see that the
procurement and delivery of items are
scheduled in a carefully planned and
balanced manner to meet the actual serv
ice needs. At all times the present and
future productive capacity of industry is
being given full consideration and plans
will provide for the maintenance of pro
duction lines rapidly to expand if that
should become necessary. Planned pro
duction schedules for major items of hard
goods have been prepared and indicate
for each specific item the plants in which
the production is proposed as well as the
quantity and delivery rate expected in
terms of units. Such schedules are sup
ported with data to justify the quantity,
the rates of delivery indicating necessity
for any departure from a reasonably
smooth production curve.
More specifically, the military depart
ments have been directed to adhere to
the following criteria in the preparation
of these planned production schedules:
1. Schedules must be realistic. Among
other things, they are to take into ac
count conditions in regard to availability
of facilities, materials, manpower, etc.
2. Procurement programs are to be
orderly and are to minimize severe, un
necessary jolts on the economy.
3. Where items are related, the sched
uling of the easier-to-get items is to con
form to that of the more difficult.
4. The quantities scheduled are to be
projected to cover all hard-goods procure
ment programs financed or to be financed
from funds of the Department of Defense
as well as the mutual defense assistance
procurement programs.
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5. Each military department in deter
mining requirements is to do so in suffi
cient detail to identify requirements for
initial equipment, combat and peacetime
usage, pipelines, and war reserves, and
take into account inventory position and
materiel on order, each giving considera
tion to the potential capacity of projected
production lines.
6. In addition to carefully planning pro
duction schedules with major programs,
the several programs of the three services
are to be interrelated one to the other
and modified where necessary if the com
posite produces a requirement for mate
rials, manpower, or other resources in ex
cess of availability.
In order to insure orderly procurement
of the so-called soft goods the Secretary
of Defense established the following
ground rules:
1. Soft goods are to be planned, or
scheduled, for procurement only at the
rate required to meet valid military re
quirements and in such a manner that,
wherever practicable, production peaking
will be avoided by the spacing of deliver
ies.
2. For items of soft goods for which
the total fiscal year 1952 procurement ob
jective for any one military department
exceeds $2 million, no more than onethird of the procurement objective for
the year shall be contracted for delivery
during any single quarter. In those cases
in which the seasonal character of pro
curement, combat needs, or similar con
siderations indicate the desirability of con
tract delivery beyond these limits, such
deviations will be authorized by the Sec
retary of the appropriate military depart
ment.
In addition to specific actions which
have just been outlined, statutory agen
cies under the Secretary of Defense, such
as the Research and Development Board
and the Munitions Board, are to carry
out their responsibilities for coordination
of the programs of the military depart
ments. Presently a primary responsibility
is to see that proper emphasis is placed
upon these programs of items which are
of the greatest need to the Department of
Defense as a whole.
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The Munitions Board, for example, is
allocating tools and production facilities
between the various, and sometimes com
peting, programs of the services in order
that those items having the greatest pri
ority will not be unnecessarily delayed.
The Munitions Board also has respon
sibility for coordination between the serv
ices on all procurement matters including
the supervision and control over items
which the services might otherwise seek
to procure in competition with each other.
All of this is being carried out in close
collaboration with the Office of Defense
Mobilization headed by Charles E. Wilson,
the Defense Production Administration,
and the National Production Administra
tion—the latter two reporting to Manly
Fleischmann. Their task is broader than
that of defense alone because it is their
job to provide for the proper allocation
of production effort between the compet
ing military and civilian requirements for
resources. I think you will be gratified to
know that, other than the healthy and
vigorous expression of differing opinions
inherent in a strong democracy, the closest
cooperation is being developed—in an at
mosphere where men of good spirit are
bending their efforts to a common task.
We believe that the basic objectives and
intent of our plans are sound. The trans
lation of these basic objectives into the
hundreds of thousands of items is diffi
cult. However, by taking advantage of the
lessons learned through the making of
costly mistakes in World War II, and
utilizing the experience of competent per
sonnel who tackled similar problems dur
ing that period, early action was taken to
make a thorough analysis of requirements
and translate the results into realistic
schedules. The first results of this effort
were reflected in the 1952 budget request
of the Department of Defense where, as
you may have heard, the initial requests,
as expressed in dollars, were reduced
from $104 billion to $60 billion, by the
elimination of the duplication of items,
pricing, reduction in estimates of quanti
ties required and the phasing of deliveries.
Subsequent to the submission of the
budget a re-review was immediately under
taken. This will be a continuing process—
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in fact a substantial number of the sched
ules have already been revised. Sufficient
progress has been made in the technique
to justify the statement that since Jan
uary—when the expanded program was
decided upon—more constructive work has
been done in analysis of requirements and
scheduling than had been accomplished
by the end of 1943 in the World War II
period. A great deal remains to be done
and we are not satisfied but we believe
that we are on the right track.
Let me give you an example of the
application of the analysis and scheduling
process by using hypothetical require
ment figures for a specific item which is
required by the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Air Force, and which is also being
provided for the free nations through the
Mutual Assistance Program. Assume that
computed requirement of jeeps to provide
sufficient quantities for Korean combat
consumption, for the initial equipment of
the forces being activated, for pipeline
requirements, initial mobilization stocks,
and combat requirements for an all-out
war might total 400,000. An analysis of
these requirements might show that some
50,000 were necessary for initial equip
ment and current use of the active forces.
Another 50,000 might be necessary in or
der that units which could be deployed in
combat would have a full pipeline and
immediate support. This 100,000 figure
would be considered an immediate require
ment but we could get by on this limited
number only if production and expansible
production lines were in being. As deliv
eries approach this total we could depend
on expansible production lines for our
mobilization and combat requirements.
In this particular item production was
almost nonexistent a year ago. Today pro
duction has reached a satisfactory rate.
This rate will probably be continued for
another year, after which we would expect
to keep multiple expansible sources pro
ducing at a minimum rate. Thus we could
avoid the accumulation of large and un
necessary stocks of war and mobilization
reserves. In many items of military equip
ment, such as aircraft and electronics, this
practice could avoid the losses which re
sult from high rates of obsolescence.

Such reasonable immediate require
ments might avoid the necessity for large
scale conversion of industry, raw materials
are conserved, and there is a lesser im
mediate need for the taxpayer’s dollars.
As of the moment few items have
reached this satisfactory production rate.
In some major items, such as aircraft
and tanks, it will be months before satis
factory production rates are achieved. As
rapidly, however, as planned production
goals are achieved we would expect to
apply the principle outlined in the jeep
example to each major item of equipment
included in the military procurement pro
gram.
A moment ago I mentioned the objective
of providing modern equipment for our
increased forces. The term “modern”
would apply to new trucks—it would apply
to new jet aircraft, which are a far cry
from the slow, propeller-type aircraft be
ing delivered to the armed services in 1941,
to new fire control, guns, and improved
types of ammunition.
Recent publicity about new weapons,
new developments in warfare, and optimis
tic statements on the military application
of atomic energy may have given the
exaggerated impression that a quick, easy,
and inexpensive security might be now at
hand.
Fortunately, there is enough truth in
both the weapons developments stories,
and in the progress reports on atomic
energy to encourage a very optimistic out
look for improved American armaments.
However, until new weapons and new mili
tary applications of atomic energy are
available for field use, our national safety
in the face of attack depends upon the
improved conventional weapons, in ample
quantity, and with sufficient trained and
equipped ground, naval, and air forces to
use them effectively. As the developments
now in progress indicate that scientific,
technical, and engineering problems are
being solved, the new weapons are be
coming complementary to conventional
weapons, and will eventually replace cer
tain types, to the ultimate improvement of
our over-all defense program.
Our present research and development
programs, and our present weapons pro
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curement programs including those in the
1952 budget, are taking full advantage of
promising developments. The procurement
programs, and the research and develop
ment programs now being projected for
future years, are also directed toward this
end.
Many future weapons may be dramatic
ally different from our present armaments.
However, I would like to repeat that we
must rely upon proved, tested, and avail
able models to win today’s battles with
the men presently trained to use them. As
Secretary Lovett recently remarked, “A
guided missile on the drawing board or at
the proving ground can’t win ‘Heartbreak
Ridge’ in Korea tomorrow morning.”
While, so far, I have emphasized matters
relating to the administration and manage
ment of the current program for building
military strength, it does not mean that we
are overlooking the long-term need for
installing improved business practices
throughout the Department of Defense. A
good start has been made, under author
ity recently granted by the Congress. To
me the potential benefits, both to the gov
ernment and the taxpayer, are exciting
and fascinating. Actually, our plans con
template nothing particularly new except
the application of proven business methods
to the financial operations of government.
The operations of commercial-type and
industrial-type activities—for example:
manufacturing arsenals, navy yards, over
haul activities, printing plants, clothing
factories, coffee roasting plants, and so
on—are being isolated and removed from
the mass of appropriation accounts. When
so isolated each such activity is given a
charter similar to that which a state would
give to a business corporation. Each activi
ty is provided with its own working capital
and with a separate hank account. From
that moment on its operations—manufac
turing, accounting on accrual basis, cost
ing—are handled in a manner similar to
those of private business enterprises with
the end product costs being billed to the
military organizational units which are the
customers of these activities.
Also, inventories of common-use stand
ard-stock items are being placed under
item and dollar control. Such inventory
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operations will be carried on—within the
framework of the military departments—
in a manner similar to those of a Sears
Roebuck or a Montgomery Ward, stocks
of items being maintained for issue with
the costs thereof being billed currently to
using activities thus making readily avail
able a current measure of consumption,
and providing effective inventory control.
I wish that time permitted a fuller des
cription of the Department’s plans of this
nature—and of the tremendous possibili
ties inherent in the application of modern
business principles to government opera
tions. We hope some time, in the not too
distant future, that we will be able to
tell you a story of accomplishments that
will increase your confidence in the ability
of the Department of Defense and the gov
ernment properly to manage its business.
So far I have been speaking of the
defense program in terms of forces and
production. The program may, however,
have more significance to this professional
group if its scope were expressed in terms
of dollars.
July 1 a year ago almost coincided with
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. At
that time the Department of Defense had
a little over $8 billion of unspent funds to
its credit in the Treasury. During the
following fiscal year (1951) Congress pro
vided $48 billion, making the total avail
able over $56 billion. During that fiscal
year, which ended three months ago, the
Department of Defense actually spent $19
billion, leaving about $37 billion to its
credit in the Treasury at the end of the
fiscal year.
For the current fiscal year Congress will
probably appropriate approximately $62
billion, not counting a contemplated sup
plemental sum for Korean combat con
sumption. Adding the $37 billion carried
over from previous years, the total avail
able to the department for the year will
be close to $100 billion.
I have mentioned several times the funds
carried over from year to year. For the
most part, these carry-over funds represent
the value of undelivered equipment and
material. For example, contracts for air
craft placed in 1951 may provide for
deliveries in 1953, the manufacturing or
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construction lead time varying from 18 to
24 months on aircraft and as much as
three years on heavy ship such as the new
aircraft carrier, the USS FORRESTAL.
In this connection I would like to empha
size that the beginning of any major mili
tary build-up, a considerable portion of the
appropriations provided and contracts
placed are in the nature of a capital in
vestment. Once such major capital invest
ments have been made, the plateau of
which General Marshall spoke can subse
quently be maintained at a lesser appro
priation level than when the program
initially is undertaken.
Separate and apart from funds appro
priated to the Department of Defense is
the military portion of the foreign aid
programs. There was $5 billion in unspent
funds to the credit of this program on
July 1. The Congress will probably ap
propriate $6 billion for the current year,
making a total of $11 billion currently
available. This amount added to the funds
available for the U.S. military forces
makes the total available for all military
purposes something over $110 billion, of
which some $44 billion is expected to be
actually expended during the current fiscal
year. The carry-over of unspent funds into
the next fiscal year for the Department of
Defense and the Military Assistance Pro
gram will be about $66 billion.
The amount of funds to be requested for
1953 has not as yet been determined, but
regardless of the level eventually decided
upon, the actual expenditures in 1953 will
be somewhat higher than in the current
fiscal year.
In the federal budget certain items
closely related to defense are not included
in the figures that I have just recited.
Funds for stockpiling of critical materials,
the Maritime Commission, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and for the govern
ment’s investment in increased natural re
sources call for an expenditure of some $4
billion. Estimated expenditures for other
government agencies and interest on the
national debt will total about $17.5 billion.

While we are on the subject of dollars
the distribution of effort within the De
partment of Defense by major categories
might be of interest. A moment ago, I
mentioned that the Congress would prob
ably provide in our regular budget request
about $62 billion. Of this total about $10.5
billion will go for the pay, allowances,
subsistence, clothing, and transportation of
military personnel. About $13.0 billion
will be allocated to “Operation and Main
tenance”. Of this total some $4.5 billion
will go for the salaries and wages of civil
ian employees. The balance will go for
fuel, oil, spare parts and other supplies
for posts, camps, stations, aircraft, ships,
and military equipment.
A little over $31 billion will go for the
procurement of major items of equipment
such as aircraft, ships, combat vehicles,
artillery, weapons, and ammunition. About
$4.5 billion will go for the acquisition and
construction of posts, camps, airfields,
warehouses, and piers. The pay and allow
ances and training of the National Guard
and reserve forces will take about $700
million. Research and development will
take another $1.5 billion. Joint activities,
together with retired pay and miscella
neous items such as caring for the pri
soners of war, will take another $500
million.
These sums are substantial but unfor
tunately because of the tensions existing in
the world today we can expect defense
expenditures to continue to be heavy in
the coming years, requiring sacrifices on
the part of all of us. The Department of
Defense will do its utmost to carry out the
program for building up our military
strength in such a manner as to merit the
confidence of the country and to make the
burden as bearable as world conditions
will permit. There are two good reasons:
first, we too are taxpayers and second, we
fully realize that the more bearable the
burden, the greater the chance for main
taining adequate defense so long as neces
sary for the security of this great country
in which we live.

Brig. Gen. T. R. RAMPY
is Auditor General of
the Air Force. It was as
a civilian that he first
brought considerable ac
counting experience to
bear on the Army Audit
Division in Washington.
He
was
commissioned
from civilian to Lieuten
ant Colonel, and in 1948
went to the Air Force
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"Auditing in the Air Force” is a very
appropriate topic for discussion be
fore this meeting of accountants, as it
deals with the proper stewardship of pub
lic funds. Billions are being appropriated
for our greatly expanded preparedness
program, which will have a serious effect
on our national resources. Shortages will
develop in many areas. We are compel
led, therefore, to make the most efficient
use of materiel and personnel so as to
exact the maximum military strength
from every dollar expended on behalf
of our defense efforts. The auditing or
ganization of the Air Force is imbued
with this concept. In fact, its members
are continually stressing the importance of
getting the “most for our Air Force dollar.”
Everyone recognizes, of course, that the
word “auditing” as used in everyday
conversation, implies the examination of
financial transactions. It is not so clear,
however, that auditing also has economic
implications. When we consider that the
annual and other reports of audits of ac
counts and financial records of the busi
ness world form the basis for important
decisions by business management, we
cannot fail to appreciate the invaluable
role of auditing among our modern busi
ness practices.
Turning to the subject of auditing
within the Air Force, let us consider the
why, what, and when of Air Force audits,
as well as something of the how from a
technical
and manpower
standpoint

which, I am sure, will be of interest to
you and every other taxpayer.
You have heard today and on various
other occasions, discussions of the comp
troller systems of the Department of
Defense, and of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. It has been emphasized that one
of the objectives of the comptroller in
the defense establishments is the devel
opment of better management practices.
It is understood, however, that the word
“management” has such a broad mean
ing that it cannot be copyrighted by any
one organization. Therefore, it is not
always a simple matter to explain just
what a comptroller does that is termed
“management.” It is relatively simple to
mention that a comptroller has respon
sibility for budgets, finance, accounting,
and auditing. Broadly speaking, it is
with these financial activities that the
comptroller may find the means of mak
ing recommendations or developing pro
cedures which will produce better man
agement practices. My particular interest
lies, of course, in the auditing field.
The comptroller of the Department of
Defense has stated that it is his policy that
auditing should be performed as an in
dependent function at all levels of com
mand as a direct responsibility of the
comptroller of the service. The Air
Force established the Auditor General as
part of the comptroller organization of
the headquarters in Washington, effective
July 1, 1948.
41
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The Auditor General, therefore, has
direct responsibility for performance of
all auditing activities throughout the Air
Force. This requires a world-wide or
ganization which, for administrative pur
poses, is divided into geographical areas
designated as “districts”. There are six
districts within the United States. One
is being organized to cover Air Force
units in Europe, Africa, and the MiddleEast portion of Asia. Another district will
be set up later this year to cover units
in the Far East, namely Japan, the Philip
pines, Guam, Okinawa, and certain other
Pacific areas.
The auditing activities of the Air Force
fall generally within two broad cate
gories. One area is that of the records
of financial and property accounting
transactions within the Air Force. The
other category relates to the audits or
examinations made in connection with
Air Force procurement contracts.
Actual performance of audits is by
personnel assigned to and under the im
mediate supervision of the audit dis
tricts. Over-all policy direction and gen
eral supervision are responsibilities of
the headquarters staff of the Auditor
General. The Auditor General maintains
close liaison with the Assistant Comptroller
of the Department of Defense, who is re
sponsible for general accounting and audit
ing policies.
The three audit agencies of the services
also have a close working relationship
with a view to development and continua
tion of uniformity in auditing policies
and procedures. This relationship in
cludes a coordination program whereby
audit responsibility in plants having con
tracts with two or more services is as
signed to a single service. Various factors
may enter into this determination, but a
major consideration is the dollar volume
of contracts of each service which may
require some type of audit examination.
I have just mentioned the close work
ing relationship existing among the audit
organizations within the Department of
Defense. The question is often asked as
to how the General Accounting Office
fits into the picture. That office, as most
of you know quite well, is headed by the

Comptroller General, who reports directly
to the Congress. It is a statutory office
and has certain responsibilities under
the statutes, one of which is the audit of
government expenditures. It has some
what the same relationship to the Con
gress that a public accounting firm has to
the board of directors or stockholders of
the corporation whose books it is exam
ining. The General Accounting Office
works very closely with the Department
of Defense in an effort to avoid and
eliminate all unnecessary duplication. You
will be interested to know that much
progress has been made in that direction.
The audit agencies of the three serv
ices have the duty of examining accounts
and transactions of the many varied ac
tivities within the respective departments
of the Department of Defense. By work
ing closely with the General Accounting
Office, we are able to develop accounting
and auditing procedures which reduce the
amount of testing and checking which that
office is required to do in order to per
form its mission. Therefore, the better we
do our job, the less detail work the Gen
eral Accounting Office has to perform.
At the outset I said that discussion of
“why”, “what”, “when” and “how” we
audit might be of interest. The answers
may be obvious or even well known to
many, but these questions are actually
asked by someone in nearly every group
I meet. So “why” do we audit; that is,
why is auditing considered a desirable
thing to do? Broadly speaking of course,
we say it is a means of protecting the
interests of the government, but why do
we think it does this? The answer lies
in the direct and indirect results ob
tained. First, audit determines the ac
curacy of the records and provides op
portunity for correction or improvement
where needed; second, it tests the pro
priety of recorded transactions, thereby
providing a means of judging the effi
ciency and integrity of individuals con
cerned; and third, the knowledge that
periodic audits will be made causes the
exercise of greater care in recordkeep
ing and is a deterrent to improper acts.
These results we believe to be real, as
does modern business which considers
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independent outside audits and internal
audit organizations valuable tools of man
agement.
A further logical query then is—
“what” in this large, complex, world
wide Air Force is appropriate to be au
dited? As has been mentioned, there are
two broad areas; one relates to inside the
Air Force and the other to outside the
Air Force, that is, procurement. To be
more specific, however, the following are
examples of the types of audits per
formed within the Air Force:
Property Accounts. This covers the rec
ords kept by persons charged with ac
countability for government owned prop
erty and includes warehouse inventories.
Fiscal Accounts. This covers the records
of the allotments and obligations of ap
propriated funds.
Quasi-official Accounts. Included in
this category are accounts of welfare ac
tivities, such as motion picture services,
non-commissioned officers’ clubs, officers’
clubs, and various other activities con
ducted pursuant to statutory authority
and for which commanders have respon
sibility for proper operation.
Commissary Accounts. Involves records
covering purchase, requisition, and dis
tribution of subsistence for Armed Serv
ices personnel and their dependents.
In the contract or industrial area,
“what” we audit is determined primarily
by the type or form of contract. Broadly
stated, audits of Air Force procurement
contracts provide information and data
for use in judging the accuracy, ade
quacy, and propriety of cost statements,
cost estimates, and claims for payment
presented by contractors. There are many
forms of contracts but the great volume
of Air Force auditing is related to two
general types—one is the cost-reimburse
ment type and the other is the priceredetermination type. There are, of course,
variations in each of these two types, but
practically all of them indicate some de
gree of audit, except that price-redetermination forms of contracts of rela
tively small amounts do not ordinarily
justify expenditure of audit time. It
should be understood that it is not now
a custom of the Air Force to audit costs
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of straight fixed-price contracts awarded
pursuant to formal bidding, although in
rare instances, an audit might be indi
cated in the case of a straight fixed-price
contract awarded through negotiation.

When Are Audits Made?
The “why” and “what” have been
briefly covered. Now “when” are audits
performed? Auditing of accounts within
the Air Force, as distinguished from au
diting of procurement contracts, is quite
similar to internal auditing within a pri
vate business. Therefore, when or how
often accounts and records are examined
by the internal audit staff depends on
various factors.
Some of these factors are:
1. Frequency of transactions.
2. Dollar value of transactions
3. Relative importance of the activity,
and
4. The established history of the rec
ords and personnel involved.
Although we often set arbitrary mini
mum requirements as to frequency of au
diting particular accounts, there are no
arbitrary limitations. The minimum re
quirements can be readily changed to
meet changes in circumstances. In some
operations, such as the accounts of
a commissary, frequent, often monthly
examinations are made because of the
nature of the activity. A commissary may
be likened to a super market, as it
handles all those items which make up
the family food basket—groceries, meats,
and produce. Then there are some ac
tivities which are examined only once a
year. An example is certain property ac
counts. Then there are others on two,
three, four, and six month schedules.
These schedules are not inflexible and
when the audit staff or the commanders
find reason to think an audit desirable, it
can be performed at any time.
There are also varying conditions which
govern “when” and how often contracts
are audited. Some of the considerations
are:
1. Type of contract
2. Dollar amount
3. Rate of production, and
4. Frequency of pricing negotiations.
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Under the cost reimbursement and
large-scale price-redetermination forms of
contracts, it is ordinarily desirable to
make what is called a “continuous ex
amination” of the cost records. This may
require assignment of personnel to fulltime duty in a particular plant. In some
cases, the volume of transactions may
justify only periodic visits in order to
keep the audit work on a current basis.
There are, however, many contracts which
are examined only at the time state
ments of costs incurred are presented for
purpose of price revision. In case of
termination of any type of contract, it is
usually necessary to make an audit of
the costs or claim of the contractor as an
aid in settlement negotiations.

How is Auditing Performed
I also promised to say something about
the “how” of Air Force auditing. It is
not my purpose to talk about methods
and techniques in detail since we try to
follow the accepted practices of the pub
lic accounting profession. It may be of
interest, however, to consider some of the
steps which have been taken to reduce the
number of auditors required. The first
step was to develop higher standards of
qualification of personnel. Progress has
been made in that area. Using better
qualified personnel, we are able to train
them in the use of selective testing pro
cedures and in the exercise of sound
business judgment. Although the same
principles are being applied in audits
of procurements contracts as in audits
of internal accounts of the Air Force, so
far there has been greater progress in the
improvement of contract auditing.
At the beginning of World War II, a
great number of large cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts were awarded by the services
but there were no guides as to just what
was necessary in the form of auditing.
There was doubt and confusion, whether
justified or not, concerning the require
ments of the General Accounting Office.
As a result, the government and the con
tractors did many things which consumed
the time and almost exhausted the pa
tience of many people. Gradually, a better

understanding of requirements has de
veloped and greater cooperation among
all concerned is evident. In several in
stances, it has been possible to develop
close team work between the internal au
dit staff of the contractor and the armed
service auditors whereby each covers
specific phases for a certain time and
furnishes reports to the other. This re
quires a thorough survey and appraisal of
the accounting procedures and internal
controls, and the preparation of an audit
program acceptable to both. Periodic
tests must be made, of course, to assure
the continuation of an accepted condi
tion. Considerable saving of personnel has
been accomplished and better relations
exist with the contractors where we have
been able to develop this coordinated ef
fort.
It may be well to mention briefly a sub
ject which has been discussed more than
any other in connection with the audit of
contracts. I refer, of course, to the Con
tract Cost Principles, Section XV of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation.
These cost principles were developed to
replace various other cost definitions
formerly used, such as Treasury Decision
5000, and the “Green Book”. Treasury
Decision 5000 was used in cost-plus-fixedfee supply contracts by the War Depart
ment during the war and the “Green
Book” was used for similar purposes by
the Navy. As most of you know, there
were questions of interpretation of these
definitions not only by administrative offi
cers and contractors, but also by the Gen
eral Accounting Office.
The present Contract Cost Principles
became effective 1 March 1949. They have
been used with little controversy in cost
reimbursement type contracts since that
time by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
There has been some controversy as to
the application of these principles to
fixed-price types of contracts, particularly
those with price revision articles. In the
absence of any clear definition of cost for
use in determining costs under such con
tracts, the audit agencies of the three
services adopted a policy which provides
that auditors will segregate costs in ac
cordance with the Contract Cost Prin
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ciples. The auditors are required, how
ever, to recognize any specific contractual
provisions. The reports of audits of con
tracts of this nature are used by pro
curement personnel in negotiating revisions
of prices. It should be noted, however,
that procurement officers are not required
to use the provisions of the Contract Cost
Principles in arriving at a base cost under
fixed-price contracts even though the audit
report shows a segregation based on the
Principles.
One of the points which I always try
to cover in discussions such as this is
that the Air Force does not, and I’m sure
the Army and Navy do not, require spe
cific accounting systems to be kept by
contractors. It is the policy to accept the
contractor’s system with the least pos
sible adjustment. Accuracy and equity in
accumulation of costs is the basic prin
ciple to be observed. The staffs of the au
dit agencies of the services are always
glad to advise contractors regarding the
accounting and auditing implications of
their contracts. In some instances, changes
in accounting systems may be indicated
as necessary, but the services do not pro
vide a specific system for use by any class
of manufacturers.
Another and most important phase of
the “how” of auditing is manpower. I
have mentioned that we have tried to
raise the qualification standard and have
met with some success, but the number
of qualified auditors available are not suffi
cient to meet the demand, as most of
you know. Although the number of audi
tors employed by the Air Force is not
restricted information, the mention of
them here would be of little value unless
it conveyed some idea of the actual work
load. The Congress requires a very de
tailed justification of our budget require
ments. Statements showing the number of
Air Force bases, estimated population of
each base, and the average number of
personnel required to perform the audits
at these installations are prepared based
on the best available data. It can be
readily understood, however, that much of
the data needed to make sound estimates
cannot be obtained because they must be
submitted at least one year before the
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beginning of the period involved. With an
expanding Air Force, it is quite difficult
to find sufficient personnel to meet the
needs as they arise. Ceilings and limita
tions are established by law and by regu
lation which make the job of adequate
performance a definite challenge.
The same procedure and situation ap
plies to the staff available for contract
audits. The greatly expanded procure
ment program of the Air Force has
caused a large increase in the number of
audit personnel required. As you prob
ably know, present Air Force procure
ment is at a rate considerably in excess of
ten billion dollars a year. This is spread
among many industrial concerns in the
form of prime contracts of the various
types mentioned before. The majority of
the dollar amount requires some type of
audit examination.
The impact of the expanded program
was felt early this year and during the
past eight months the audit staff has in
creased about 100%. The present staff is
approximately 2,000—which is made up
of approximately 1,400 civilians, 475 offi
cers, and 125 airmen. A considerable
number of certified public accountants
and members of the American Institute
of Accountants make up this complement.
Most of the officers are reservists who, ac
cording to present policy, will have to be
released at the end of 17 or 21 months’
service. We are faced with the problem of
replacement of these men as well as meet
ing our present needs for additional per
sonnel. If we must lose the reserve offi
cers now on duty, their replacements
should come from the inactive reserve
pool approximately three months ahead
of releases. In other words, reserves who
are now on involuntary recall might be
replaced by those who have not yet been
recalled to active duty. This may appear
to be, and in fact is, a somewhat harsh
way of doing things, but the present
situation indicates the necessity for shar
ing the burden. In some cases we could
utilize civilians as replacements to whom
employers might give assurance of return
to their jobs at the expiration of some
stated period. These are just ideas of my
own and do not represent any established
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policy of which I am aware. And, of
course, this is only one of many areas
where similar problems exist. No doubt
representatives of the accounting profes
sion will be called upon from time to
time to assist the services in solving this
situation which is becoming more acute
every day.
Another phase of the “how” of audits
in the Air Force is—how do we use all
of this talent we have and want? I ex
plained earlier that there is a headquar

ters staff and an operating staff divided
into geographic districts. Each of these
districts also has a headquarters office
which is responsible for supervision of
auditing personnel in resident offices at
Air Force bases and contractors’ plants,
and strategically located branch offices
where audits are performed on a mobile
basis. The headquarters offices have three
divisions: The Internal Audits Division;
the Industrial Audits Division; and the
Administrative Division. This corresponds
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to the organizational set-up of the Au
ditor General Headquarters.
The six districts in the United States
average approximately 300 personnel
each. Each headquarters office is headed
by a district chief who has a staff of
accountants equivalent to supervising sen
iors and seniors, with the usual clerical
assistance necessary to handle correspond
ence, personnel work, typing, and so on.
The primary mission of the district is per
formance of audits through resident and
branch offices. The district headquarters
exercises direct supervision over the resi
dent and branch offices, through assign
ment of personnel, on-the-job assistance,
surveys of field performance, current re
view of reports, and continuous follow-up
as to status of work assignments. This
includes review for (1) technical com
petence of personnel, (2) uniformity of
application of policies, (3) clarity of
presentation, (4) improvement of tech
niques and wordings, and (5) unneces
sary supporting schedules.
The headquarters supervision of the Au
ditor General in respect to the districts
is exercised by the staff located in what
is called the Headquarters Extension
Office at Philadelphia, Pa. This office
operates as a part of the Washington
office, under the direct supervision of the
Assistant Auditor General, Colonel Ken
neth W. Hurst, a member of your organiza
tion, who was recalled to active duty
about a year ago. The amount of super
vision necessary in the operation of an
expanding organization with many new
employees, is much greater than that re
quired in a long-established, going con
cern. During this growing period, the
amount of supervision given to field ac
tivities has, of necessity, been inadequate.
It is, however, the responsibility of the
headquarters staff to make periodic sur
veys of district headquarters offices and
various resident and branch offices. In ad
dition, of course, there is the necessity for
over-all control of the organization and a
knowledge of the current condition of the
audit program at all times. This contact
is maintained through correspondence,
field visits, reports of operating activities
from the districts, and through review of
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reports of audits. By these and other
means, we obtain uniformity of applica
tion of policies among the districts and
maintain a progressively higher standard
of performance. Many of the reservists
returned to active duty are engaged in
this top level supervisory work both at
the Auditor General Headquarters and at
the district headquarters offices.
I should like, at this point, to repeat
the use made of the reports of audit.
First, as to reports of audits within the
Air Force, these are used by commanders
and their staffs as a means of determin
ing the status of accounts, the quality of
personnel keeping the records, the integ
rity of individuals involved in transac
tions, and as a means of developing im
provements in the operation of their
activities. The audit reports in connection
with procurement are generally delivered
promptly to contracting officers or con
tract negotiators. In the case of cost re
imbursement-type contracts, the contract
ing officer uses the statement of the
auditor in considering the contractor’s
claim for reimbursement. Very few dif
ferences of opinion arise between the
auditors and contracting officers on these
contracts. On the price revision or price
redetermination form of contract, the au
ditors’ findings are used by negotiators
and procurement cost analysts as an aid
in studying the contractors’ statements of
cost and cost proposals.
I have particularly emphasized this in
order to focus your attention on the need
for close cooperation between contractors’
accountants and Air Force auditors, as
well as other service auditors. Contractors
should try to find out the accounting im
plications of their contracts as early as
possible. They should then be able to
make the records and data available with
a minimum of trouble and loss of time.
The less difficult the audit, the less time
required and therefore the fewer men
needed. Contractors can often save audit
time by supplying schedules which they
can prepare much faster than the audi
tor who may be unfamiliar with the plant
or office. Sometimes the facilities, desks,
lighting, and location of working space
provided for auditors tend to delay the
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audit work. In this emergency, when the
maximum use of manpower is essential,
the Air Force is constantly seeking ways
to simplify procedures and get the great
est possible production from the available
audit personnel.
This element of teamwork is an essen
tial part of our capacity to get the job
done. The American Institute of Account
ants is to be particularly commended for
its splendid cooperation in helping us to

solve complex problems of an accounting
nature, and in rendering invaluable assis
tance in our continual search for account
ing talent.
I sincerely trust that this brief picture
of auditing in the Air Force has given
you some conception of the problems which
we face, particularly from the standpoint
of manpower, and that you will continue
to do all within your power to aid in
this most vital program.
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